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 NOTES
 Article III Limits on Article I Courts:
 The Coiistitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court
 and the 1979 Magistrate Act
 In providing for the establishment of a federal judiciary, article III,
 section 1, of the Constitution1 appears to require Congress to grant federal
 judges life tenure2 and undiminishable salaries. In some circumstances,
 however, Congress has established federal tribunals that do not comply with
 the requirements of article 111,3 relying on the doctrine of legislative, or
 article I, courts.4 Recently, in response to caseload pressures burdening
 the federal district courts, Congress has drawn upon this doctrine to create
 an article I bankruptcy court and to expand the judicial powers of magis-
 strates.5 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19786 establishes a bankruptcy
 1. The section provides:
 The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
 in such inferior Coturts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
 The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
 good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compenlsation,
 which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
 U.S. Const. art. III, ? 1. Congress's power, set out in art. I, ? 8, to create inferior federal
 courts has been construed to refer only to courts described in article III, and thus appears to
 be limited by the requirements of that article. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543
 (1962); C. Wright, Federal Courts ? 11, at 30-31 (3d ed. 1976); Katz, Federal Legislative
 Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 894 n.2 (1930).
 2. "Good Behaviour" has always been taken to mean tenure for life, with removal only
 according to the impeachment standard set forth in article II, ? 4. See, e.g., O'Donoghue v.
 United States, 289 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1933).
 3. A federal court is considered an article I court if its judges do not have life tenure
 and constitutionally protected salaries. In addition, article I courts are not limited to hearing
 cases comprised within the article III grant of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ex
 Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929); C. Wright, supra note 1, ? 11.
 4. The term-and much of the doctrine-derives from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
 in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828), discussed at notes 88-92 and
 accompanying text infra, in which the Justice contrasted "constitutional" courts, established
 by Congress in accordance with article III, with "legislative" courts, which need not meet
 those requirements. Legislative courts are now primarily referred to as article I courts, be-
 cause many of these tribunals are established as "necessary and proper" exercises of an article
 I, ? 8, legislative power. See notes 118-29 and accompanying text infra.
 For general discussions of the doctrine, see 1 Moore's Federal Practice ? 0.4 (2d ed.
 1979); C. Wright, supra note 1, ? 11.
 5. The litigation explosion of recent years has severely taxed the resources of the federal
 judicial system at all levels, generating considerable comment and a variety of proposals for
 reform. Relief for overburdened district judges was a primary objective of the original
 Magistrate Act in 1968. See H.R. Rep. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1968), reprinted
 in [1968] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4252, 4257. Caseload pressures have motivated the
 continued expansion of magisti ates' powers. See Silberman, Masters and Maoistrates Part
 II: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1297, 1298 (1975); Note, Article III Con-
 straints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88
 Yale L.J. 1023, 1027-28 & n.27 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Article III and Magis-
 trates]. The need to free bankruptcy cases from the overburdened dockets of the district
 courts was a major impetus for creating a new bankruptcy court. See Subcomm. on Civil and
 Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. oni the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Constitu-
 tional Bankruptcy Courts 8-9 (Comm. Print No. 3 1977) [hereinafter cited as Comm. Print
 No. 3].
 6. Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. II, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. ?? 151-160,
 771-775, 1471-1482 (Supp. 1979)). The Act is further discussed at notes 14-34 and ac-
 companying text infra.
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 court staffed by judges who will have fourteen-year terms7 and unprotected
 salaries,8 and who may be removed from office for a variety of nonimpeach-
 alble offenses.9 The Magistrate Act of 197910 authorizes magistrates, who
 are appointed by district judges to serve eight-year terms,"1 to render final
 judgment in civil cases and criminal misdemeanor cases referred to them by
 district judges. Both of these enactments boldly expand existing limits on
 the doctrine of legislative courts,12 and thus raise serious questions about
 the scope of congressional power to delegate article III judicial power to
 non-article-III tribunals.'3
 This Note analyzes the constitutionality of the new bankruptcy court
 and the Magistrate Act in light of the current rationales for article I courts,
 and concludes that neither can be justified under existing conceptions of the
 limits on congressional power to create tribunals that do not comply with
 the requirements of article III. The Note argues, however, that these con-
 ceptions do not resolve the constitutional question completely, because they
 do not satisfactorily suggest how far Congress may go beyond the existing
 limits of the doctrine. Moreover, these rationales are inadequate because
 they fail to give proper weight to the values underlying article III. Ac-
 cordingly, the Note concludes that the constitutionality of any article I court
 must be evaluated in light of article III policies. The Note then applies an
 article III policy analysis to the bankruptcy and magistrate systems, and
 concludes that both are fundamentally at odds with the values article III
 was designed to protect.
 To lay the foundation for this constitutional analysis, the first section
 of the Note examines the purposes, structure, and conceptual underpinnings
 of the new bankruptcy court and the expanded powers of magistrates.
 I. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT AND THE MAGISTRATE SYSTEM AS
 ARTICLE I COURTS
 Although somewhat different in purpose and conceptual basis, the new
 bankruptcy and magistrate systems employ similar mechanisms for the re-
 7. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 153(a) (Supp. 1979).
 8. Id. ? 154. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
 9. Id. ? 153(b). See notes 57-59 and accompanying text infra.
 10. Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (1979) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. ?? 631, 633, 636;
 18 U.S.C.A. ? 3401 (Supp. 1980)).
 11. 28 U.S.C. ? 631(a)-(h) (1976).
 12. See notes 88-145 and accompanying text infra.
 13. Many of these questions were raised and considered in congressional hearings on the
 bankruptcy and magistrate systems. See generally Bankruptcy Court Revision: Hearings
 on H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm.
 on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Court Hear-
 ings]; Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Hearings on the Court Administration Structure for Bank-
 ruptcy Cases (Comm. Print No. 13 1977) [hereinafter cited as Comm. Print. No. 13]; Comm.
 Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 18-33; Jurisdiction of United States Magistrates: Hearings on S.
 1283 before the Subcomm. On Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Sen. Comm. on
 the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976);
 H.R. Rep. No. 1364, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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 form of judicial administration. Each system establishes a structure of
 judicial officers unprotected by article III's tenure and salary guarantees as
 auxiliaries to the district courts. These nontenured officers are empowered
 to enter binding judgments in a broad range of cases falling within the sub-
 ject matter limits of article III.
 A. Purposes and Structure
 The new bankruptcy court is designed to correct two critical deficiencies
 of the old bankruptcy referee system. The first, and most pressing, problem
 was the narrow jurisdiction exercised by bankruptcy referees.14 Under the
 old system, referees could hear only cases involving the actual disposition
 of debtors' property, or "summary" suits."5 Other claims affecting the
 debtor's assets but not involving distribution to creditors were deemed
 "plenary" suits, and had to be filed and tried separately in federal district
 or state courts.16 Besides encouraging costly and time-consuming juris-
 dictional disputes,17 this bifurcated system often produced judgments in
 plenary suits that conflicted with or otherwise hampered the referee's de-
 terminations in liquidation or reorganization proceedings.18
 The second principal deficiency of the referee system was its lack of
 independence from the district courts.19 Referees could only hear suits
 referred to them by district judges and were dependent on district judges to
 confirm their recommendations.20 Consequently, bankruptcy proceedings
 14. The need for expanded jurisdiction was the most frequently cited reason for reform-
 ing the system for adjudicating bankruptcy claims. See generally Bankruptcy Court
 Hearings, supra note 13; Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before
 the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
 Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., pt. 4, at 2736-37 (1975-1976); Report of the Commission on the Bank-
 ruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 88-92,
 pt. 2, at 30-33 (1973); Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 7-8.
 15. For a description of the jurisdiction of bankruptcy referees, see Comm. Print No.
 3, supra note 5, at 2-5; Comm. Print No. 13, supra note 13, at 1-3. In "summary" suits, the
 court is deemed in possession of the debtor's property, and can only dispose of property in
 its possession. Summary suits thus include little more than creditors' claims against debtors.
 For a discussion of the limits of summary jurisdiction, see Note, Scope of the Summary
 Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 489 (1940). See also Forum,
 Bankruptcy Reform: A New Judiciary, 48 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 367, 369-71 (1979).
 16. Plenary matters might include suits by the trustee against the bankrupt's debtors, or
 matters with potentially great impact on the bankrupt's assets, such as labor or contract
 disputes. The district judge or referee sitting in bankruptcy may hear a plenary suit only if
 the defendant to that suit consents. See, e.g., Comm. Print No. 13, supra note 13, at 2-3;
 Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 2-4. Consent, however, was often constructive, imputed
 from certain procedural lapses or actions by the adverse party. See Broude, Jurisdiction
 and Venue Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 48 Am. Bankr. L.J. 231, 233 (1974); Forum,
 supra note 15, at 370.
 17. See Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13, at 194 (statement of John W.
 Ingraham); Comm. Print No. 13, supra note 13, at 2.
 18. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1978), reprinted in [1978]
 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5803-04; Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13, at
 18-27 (statement of J. Stanley Shaw).
 19. Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 9-12.
 20. Under the system in effect until the Bankruptcy Reform Act is fully implemented
 on April 1, 1984, see Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, ? 402(b), bankruptcy jurisdiction is first
 vested in the district courts. 11 U.S.C. ?? 1(10), lla (1976). District judges refer nearly
 all bankruptcy proceedings to bankruptcy referees, although the judges may retain any case
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 were subject to the delays inherent in the district courts' overcrowded
 dockets.2' The subordinate position of referees also diminished the prestige
 of the office and reduced the respect accorded their decisions.22 Thus, by
 fostering delay and inharmonious adjudications, the limited jurisdiction and
 dependent status of referees frustrated the bankruptcy system's principal
 goal of swiftly rehabilitating debtors.23
 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 seeks to remedy these problems
 through two sweeping reforms. First, in order to provide a forum capable
 of quickly and uniformly resolving all disputes that affect a given debtor,
 it greatly expands the jurisdiction of federal bankruptcy tribunals by elimi-
 nating the summary/plenary distinction.24 The new bankruptcy courts have
 jurisdiction of all civil proceedings ansing under, or "related to" cases
 arising under, the substantive federal bankruptcy laws.25 Although limited
 in principle to a narrow class of federal question cases,26 the scope of the
 jurisdiction of the new bankruptcy courts, which encompasses claims based
 on both federal and state law,27 will equal, and in some instances exceed,
 for themselves. The referees are salaried court employees appointed by the judges of the
 court for six-year terms. 11 U.S.C. ?? 61, 62 (1976). Rule 901 of the Bankruptcy Rules,
 promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1974, 415 U.S. 1003 (1974), confers the title of
 "bankruptcy judge" on the referees. To distinguish these court officers from the new full-
 fledged bankruptcy judges, this Note will continue to use the designation "referee."
 Referees perform some administrative duties, such as appointing trustees or supervising
 estate liquidation, but they primarily resolve disputes between creditors and debtors. The
 authority to enter final judgment in such disputes remains with the district judge. 11 U.S.C.
 ? 66 (1976). See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 2-6; Comm. Print No. 13, supra
 note 13, at 1-3.
 21. See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 8-11.
 22. Id.
 23. Id.
 24. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
 Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6010.
 25. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1471(b) (1979 Supp.). This grant of jurisdiction became effective im-
 mediately, on Oct. 1, 1979.
 If a case falling within this jurisdictional grant is not filed originally in the bankruptcy
 court, it may be removed to the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1478 (1979 Supp.).
 26. Presumably the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court would be limited to matters in
 bankruptcy falling within Congress's power to make uniform bankruptcy regulations, U.S.
 Const. art. I, ? 8, cl. 4, since that clause is the source of Congress's power to establish the
 court.
 27. The House report makes clear that "[alctions that formerly had to be tried in
 State court or in Federal district court, at great cost and delay to the estate, may now be
 tried in the bankruptcy courts." H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 24, at 445, [1978]
 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6400.
 Because so many of the disputes related to bankruptcy proceedings are grounded solely
 in state law and may now be tried in a congressionally created court regardless of diversity
 of citizenship, some have questioned whether bankruptcy cases "arise under" federal law for
 purposes of article III jurisdiction. See, e.g., Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 17-19.
 This question arises because the plurality opinion in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
 Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), concluded, in dictum, that bankruptcy cases were within
 article III jurisdiction only when federal law created the cause of action or when there was
 diversity of citizenship. Id. at 594-99. Six Justices strongly repudiated the plurality's reason-
 ing and argued that bankruptcy cases are always within the scope of article III. Their
 position seems correct in view of the longstanding principle that article III jurisdiction must
 be coextensive with Congress's article I, ? 8, legislative powers, because "the Constitution
 meant to provide ample means to accomplish its own ends by its own courts," Mitchell v.
 Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 Fed. Cas. 496, 499 (1843). Therefore, if Congress
 pursuant to its article I, ? 8, cl. 4, power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, concludes
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 that of the district courts.28 Indeed, the range of work of the article I bank-
 ruptcy judges will be virtually the same as the range of matters heard by
 article III district judges.29 The only significant distinction is that a bank-
 ruptcy judge's cases will all be in some way related to an underlying
 bankruptcy proceeding.
 The second major judicial reform instituted by the Bankruptcy Act
 strengthens the autonomy of the bankruptcy tribunals.30 Although described
 in the Act as "adjuncts" of the district courts,3l the new bankruptcy courts
 will be substantially independent. As courts of original jurisdiction, they
 will control their own dockets.82 In addition, although they may not enjoin
 that state law claims should be adjudicated in federal bankruptcy court, article III judicial
 power must necessarily apply to these suits. Otherwise, the congressional power to assure
 uniformity would lack substance. See Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Tidewater,
 337 U.S. at 652 n.3; Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516, 518 (1875)
 This conclusion is supported by the Court's decisions in Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S.
 642 (1947), upholding federal jurisdiction over state-law-based plenary suits in reorganization
 proceedings, and Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 371-74 (1934), suggesting that economy
 and convenience, rather than article III impediments, were the reason most plenary suits were
 left to state courts. These decisions illustrate that where Congress confers jurisdiction to
 advance federal interests stemming from an article I legislative power, the cases "arise under"
 federal law, even though the substantive decision may rest on state law. P. Bator, P. Mishkin,
 D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System
 416-17, 868-69 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Hart & Wechsler]. State law claims related
 to a bankruptcy proceeding are thus within the scope of article III federal question jurisdiction,
 and may be committed to an article III court. See Bondurant, The Bankruptcy Court as a
 Constitutional Court, 45 Am. Bankr. L.J. 235, 237-39 (1971).
 28. The potential breadth of this expanded jurisdiction is illustrated by the congressional
 testimony of an attorney who handled the bankruptcy reorganization of a major supermarket
 chain. Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13, at 18-27 (statement of J. Stanley Shaw).
 State law claims arising during the five-year reorganization included disputes over the validity
 of contracts, landlord-tenant relationships, reclamation of goods, foreclosures of security
 interests, and alleged torts. Id. At the same time the bankrupt was the defendant in an action
 to enforce collective bargaining agreements and a title VII employment discrimination action
 filed in response to massive layoffs. The trustee initiated an antitrust action against several
 of the supermarket's suppliers and a securities fraud action against the parent corporation.
 Id. Because each of these state and federal law disputes affected the bankrupt's assets,
 financial condition, and obligations, they were all "related to" the underlying reorganization
 proceeding, and thus would be within the expanded jurisdiction of the new bankruptcy court.
 29. See Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13, at 113 (statement of Hon. Wesley
 Brown); id. at 57-58 (testimony of Hon. Simon H. Rifkind).
 30. The House Judiciary Committee originally proposed an article III bankruptcy court
 entirely separate from the district courts, see H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), because
 the subcommittee studying the problem, the full Judiciary Committee, the Attorney General,
 and his Office of Legal Counsel all concluded that the necessary expanded jurisdiction could
 be exercised constitutionally only by a court created in accordance with the requirements of
 article III. See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 18-33 (subcommittee's position); H.R.
 Rep. No. 595, supra note 24, at 52 (1977) (Judiciary Committee view); Bankruptcy Court
 Hearings, supra note 13, at 216 (testimony of Att'y Gen. Griffin Bell); Bankruptcy Reform
 Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 & H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
 Judicial Machinery of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1977)
 (Office of Legal Counsel position) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
 This proposal, though approved by the Judiciary Committee, encountered strong political
 opposition stemming from fears that a separate court of equal rank would diminish the
 prestige and influence of the district courts. The opponents were successful, and the original
 version of H.R. 8200 never passed the House. See Comm. Print No. 13, supra note 13, at
 1, 5-9.
 31. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 151(a) (1979 Supp.).
 32. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1471(c) (1979 Supp.) provides that "[t]he bankruptcy court for the
 district in which a case under title II is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction con-
 ferred . . . on the district courts." (Emphasis added.)
 This language implies that all bankruptcy claims must be heard by bankruptcy judges.
 District judges formerly had discretion to refer matters to referees. 11 U.S.C. ? 66 (1976).
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 another court or punish certain kinds of criminal contempt, they will
 exercise the other inherent powers of an article III federal court, including
 the powers to enter final judgments and issue writs of execution.3 Thus
 endowed with nearly the full array of judicial powers, the new bankruptcy
 courts will be able to resolve disputes expeditiously, without time-consuming
 references from, and recommendations to, the district courts. Despite these
 increased elements of independence, however, bankruptcy judges will still
 be subject to the disciplinary and removal power of the other federal judges
 in the circuit.4
 Unlike the Bankruptcy Act, the Magistrate Act of 1979 is not designed
 to remedy distinctive problems affecting the adjudication of particular dis-
 putes. Instead, it responds to problems-particularly overcrowded dockets
 and insufficient manpower-that have hampered all federal courts in recent
 years.35 The Act continues the trend inaugurated by the Federal Magis-
 trates Act of 1968,36 which established magistrates as assistants to district
 judges,37 by augmenting magistrates' judicial powers and thus expanding
 their role from assistants to de facto district judges.
 The office of United States magistrate was intended to free district
 judges from various procedural and administrative tasks so that they might
 devote more time to the actual trial of cases.8 Magistrates are officers of
 the district court, who, prior to the 1979 Act, were empowered to determine
 nondispositive pretrial motions; 39 conduct evidentiary hearings and recom-
 mend dispositions in summary civil proceedings,40 including prisoner peti-
 33. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1481 (1979 Supp.): "A bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a
 court of equity, law, and admiralty, but may not enjoin another court or punish a criminal
 contempt not committed in the presence of the judge of the court or warranting a punishment
 of imprisonment." The limit on the criminal contempt power stems from the view that
 federal criminal penalties may be imposed only by an article III court because of due process
 and the protections of the sixth amendment. See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,
 262-64 (1969); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955). Proponents
 of an article I bankruptcy court suggested limiting the criminal contempt power to overcome
 constitutional difficulties with the article I structure. See Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra
 note 13, at 89 (testimony of Hon. Shirley Hufstedler), 137 (testimony of Hon. Ruggiero
 Aldisert), 217 (testimony of Att'y Gen. Griffin Bell).
 34. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 153(b) (1979 Supp.).
 35. See note 5 supra.
 36. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified at 18 U.S.C. ?? 3401-3402; 28 U.S.C.
 ?? 604, 631-639 (1976).
 37. The 1979 Act is the second major expansion of magistrates' powers since the 1968
 Act was passed. In 1976 Congress amended the 1968 Act to empower magistrates to hear
 potentially dispositive pretrial motions and to conduct evidentiary hearings on prisoners'
 habeas corpus petitions, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
 ? 636(b) (1) (B) (1976)).
 38. See, e.g., Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act Before the Subcomm. on Im-
 provements in Judicial Machinery of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d
 Sess. 66 (1968) (testimony of Committee Counsel Poff); H.R. Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong.,
 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6162, 6166.
 39. 28 U.S.C. ? 636(b) (1) (A) (1976). Under this section, magistrates routinely resolve
 pretrial discovery disputes. For a description of magistrates' pretrial authority, see Silberman,
 supra note 5, at 1338-40.
 40. 28 U.S.C. ? 636(b) (1) (B) (1976).
 The recommended disposition procedure is frequently used to have magistrates review
 administrative determinations regarding entitlement to benefits. See Silberman, supra note 5,
 at 1334-38. This procedure comports with article III only if authority and responsibility for
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 tions for post-conviction relief;4' and serve as special masters to assist the
 court with factfinding.42 These tasks did not entail the exercise of "judicial
 power"43-ultimate adjudicatory authority always remained with the dis-
 trict judge." Under the scheme of the 1968 Act, a magistrate's hearing
 report consisted of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
 was subject to the district judge's de novo review.45 Indeed, courts re-
 viewing the permissible scope of magistrates' duties have stressed that the
 district judge's retention of final decisionmaking authority is necessary to
 avoid article III infirmities.46
 rendering a final judgment remains with the district judge. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261,
 269 n.5, 271 (1976).
 41. Authorization in ? 636(b) (1) (B) for magistrates to hear applications for post-trial
 relief, or habeas corpus petitions, was added by the 1976 Amendments to the Magistrates Act,
 Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (1976). This amendment was designed to overrule the
 Supreme Court's decision in Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974), which construed the
 Federal Habeas Corpus Act and the Magistrates Act to require an article III judge to hear
 habeas petitions. The Court feared that, despite review by district judges, habeas petitions
 would be adjudicated de facto by magistrates, resulting in abdication of the judicial function
 to the detriment of article III. Article III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1044. These
 constitutional doubts appear well founded. See notes 46 & 203-23 and accompanying text
 infra.
 42. The use of magistrates as special masters is limited to the situations detailed in Fed.
 R. Civ. P. 53 unless the parties consent to a broader use of the magistrate as master. 28 U.S.C.
 ? 636(b) (2) (1976). See Silberman, supra note 5, at 1321-32.
 43. See notes 139-43 and accompanying text infra.
 44. Under the 1968 Act, only a judge could order entry of final executory judgments,
 enjoin behavior, or issue contempt citations. To the extent local court rules seem to provide
 otherwise, courts of appeals have continued to insist on district judge participation. See
 notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text infra.
 The only apparent exception to the rule of judicial participation is the statute authorizing
 magistrates to conduct trials of minor criminal offenses when the defendant consents. See
 28 U.S.C. ? 636(a) (3) (1976), which gives magistrates the jurisdiction described in 18 U.S.C.
 ? 3401(a), to "try persons accused of, and sentence persons convicted of, minor offenses
 committed within that judicial district." The defendant may elect, however, to be tried by an
 article III judge. 18 U.S.C. ? 3401(b) (1976). This provision sparked extensive constitutional
 debate in hearings on the 1968 Magistrates Act. Its supporters argued that petty offenses had
 long been considered an implied exception to article III and the right to a jury trial, and that
 the defendant's consent vitiated any constitutional difficulties. See generally Note, The Validity
 of United States Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, 60 Va. L. Rev. 697 (1974) [hereinafter
 cited as Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction]. Justices Black and Douglas, on the other hand,
 concluded that minor offenses are not excepted from the sixth amendment or article III, and
 thus that this provision of the Magistrates Act was unconstitutional. Accordingly, they dis-
 sented from the adoption of Court rules based upon the Act, 51 F.R.D. 206, 209 (1971)
 (Black, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has never passed on this issue directly.
 45. Parties have the right under 28 U.S.C. ? 636(b) (1) (1976) to object to a magistrate's
 findings. The judge must then determine the matter objected to de novo. Moreover, whether
 or not the parties object, "[a] judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
 or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate. The judge may also
 receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions." Id.
 46. See, e.g., Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976) (although declining to reach
 constitutional issues, the Court intimated article III was satisfied bcause "[tthe authority-
 and the responsibility-to make an informed, final determiation ... remains with the judge");
 United States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976, 982 (7th Cir.) (Magistrates Act "clearly requires
 the Article III judge to make a de novo determination. Article III is therefore satisfied."),
 cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979) (No. 79-8); Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689, 692-93
 (2d Cir. 1978); Noorlander v. Ciccone, 489 F.2d 642, 648 (8th Cir. 1973); TPO, Inc. v.
 McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972). Courts of appeals have insisted on preserving the
 district judge's role by refusing to accept appeals from magistrate-conducted cases unless the
 judge has reviewed the case and entered final judgment. See Horton v. State St. Bank &
 Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1979); Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978);
 Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1978); Reciprocal Exch. v. Noland, 542 F.2d
 462 (8th Cir. 1976).
 1980] ARTICLE I COURTS 567
 The Magistrate Act of 1979, which parallels local court rules now in
 effect in some districts,47 provides further relief for overburdened district
 courts by authorizing complete trial by magistrate, eliminating the require-
 ment of de novo district court review. Under the Act, district judges may
 refer civil proceedings, including jury trials and criminal misdemeanor
 proceedings, to a magistrate for determination.48 If the parties consent to
 such a reference,49 the magistrate may then hear, determine, and enter a final
 judgment in the matter.50 Thus, the Act essentially vests magistrates with
 full judicial power and makes them complete substitutes for article III
 district judges. Magistrates will potentially have jurisdiction of any civil case
 now within the cognizance of federal district courts, with no apparent limits
 on their coercive, executory authority.5l
 Despite the similarity of their power and jurisdiction to that of district
 judges, neither the new bankruptcy judges nor federal magistrates will be
 article III judges. Bankruptcy judges, appointed by the President subject
 to Senate confirmation,52 will serve fourteen-year terms,53 and their salaries
 may be subject to adjustment.54 Federal magistrates will continue to be
 47. Local rules in some districts go beyond the statutorily delineated duties in the 1968
 Act and permit magistrates to conduct civil trials, including jury trials, when the parties
 consent. See Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform Before
 the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
 Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1977) (memorandum on number of
 magistrate trials prepared by Administrative Office of the United States Courts and Department
 of Justice) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings]. For an example of such a local rule and its
 application in a jury trial, see Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979).
 Prior to the 1979 Act, statutory authorization for such rules authorizing magistrate trials
 was purportedly provided by 28 U.S.C. ? 636(b) (3) (1976), which permits magistrates to
 perform "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
 United States." The legislative history of this provision indicates, however, that Congress
 contemplated that these "additional duties" would largely be administrative or pretrial, leaving
 more time for trials to the judges. H.R. Rep. No. 1609, supra note 38, at 2, 4, 6-7, [1976]
 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6162-66. See also Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247,
 1251 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting); Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir.
 1978).
 48. Pub. L. No. 96-82, ?2, 93 Stat. 643 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. ?636(c)(1) (1980
 Supp.)) (civil matters); id. ??7(a), (b) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. ? 3401(a) (1980 Supp.))
 (misdemeanors).
 49. 28 U.S.C.A. ?636(c)(1), (c)(2) (1980 Supp.). The statute's consent procedure is
 designed to shield litigants from judicial pressure to accept the reference and thereby to avoid
 "forced consent." Systemic pressures, however, may prove harder to avoid. See notes 218
 & 219 and accompanying text infra; Article III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1051 &
 nn.150 & 151.
 50. 28 U.S.C.A. ?636(c)(3) (1980 Supp.).
 51. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 636(c) (3) (1980 Supp.) is quite explicit in substituting a magistrate
 for a district judge. The 1979 Magistrate Act has no section limiting the powers of magis-
 trates, whereas the Bankruptcy Reform Act does limit the coercive reach of bankruptcy judges,
 see note 33 and accompanying text supra.
 52. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 152 (1979 Supp.).
 53. Id. ? 153(a).
 54. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 154 (1979 Supp.). This section provides for cost-of-living adjustments.
 Congress recently refused to appropriate the full amount necessary to make these adjustments,
 Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1979, at 24, col. 4. In Will v. United States, 478 F. Supp. 621 (N.D.
 Ill. 1979), juris. postponed, 100 S. Ct. 1010, (1980) (No. 79-983), several article III judges
 challenged a similar congressional action. The district court held that article III guaranteed
 the judges the full salary increase, so that Congress's action amounted to an unconstitutional
 salary diminution. Article I judges would be subject to the salary reduction.
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 appointed by a majority vote of the district court judges of each district55
 to serve eight-year terms.
 Although under current law an individual magistrate's salary cannot be
 reduced during his term of office, this statutory protection can, of course, be
 modified or abolished.56 Both bankruptcy judges and magistrates can be
 removed from office for "incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or
 physical or mental disability," the former by a majority vote of the judicial
 council of their circuit,57 the latter by a similar vote of the district judges of
 their district.58 Because these are not impeachable "high crimes and mis-
 demeanors," the removal provisions also fail to comport with the life tenure
 guarantee in article III.59
 Because they do not enjoy life tenure and undiminishable salaries, the
 bankruptcy judges are article I judges; the bankruptcy court is thus an article
 I court.60 The magistrate system is also appropriately analyzed under the
 doctrine of article I courts. Although prior to the 1979 Act, magistrates
 were deemed assistants to article III judges, or "parajudges," rather than
 actual article I judges,6' once they start exercising judicial power they will
 be, in effect, article I judges, even though they will not staff a separate court
 system.62
 Litigants appearing before bankruptcy judges and magistrates will not
 be, in effect, article I judges, even though they will not staff a separate court
 will remain available in article III tribunals. Under the Bankruptcy Act,
 final judgments entered by bankruptcy judges may be appealed either
 to panels of bankruptcy judges with subsequent recourse to the courts
 of appeals,03 or to the district courts.64 Alternatively, bankruptcy appeals
 55. In addition, the 1979 Act requires the district courts to establish merit selection
 panels to assist the appointment process. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 631(b) (5) (1980 Supp.).
 56. Even if an article I judicial officer is granted life tenure and undiminishable salary
 by statute, Congress is free to change the statute. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
 593 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
 57. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 153(b) (1979 Supp.). Bankruptcy judges are entitled to a pre-
 removal hearing. See In re the Investigation of the Administration of the Bankruptcy Court,
 610 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1979).
 58. 28 U.S.C. ? 631(h) (1976).
 59. See note 1 supra; Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 691-703
 (1979).
 60. See note 3 supra.
 61. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 268 (1976); Article III and Magistrates, supra
 note 5, at 1047 n.132.
 62. Professor Silberman argues that the legislative court model, although relevant to
 analyzing magistrates' authority, provides an "imperfect analogy." Silberman, supra note 5,
 at 1310. She reasons that while Congress establishes legislative courts pursuant to a specific
 article I, ? 8, power, its sources of authority for creating magistrates are article III and
 article II, ? 2 (Congress may vest power to appoint judicial officers in courts). No matter
 which article Congress's ultimate authority is grounded in, however, the "necessary and
 proper" clause is still the immediate vehicle, and article III concerns still set the overarching
 limit on the scope of what is "necessary and proper" in this context. Moreover, when Con-
 gress vests article III "judicial power" in a non-article-Ill decisionmaker, whether called an
 article I "judge" or a "magistrate," the effect on the principles of article III is the same, and
 the doctrine of article I courts therefore provides a useful analytical framework.
 63. 28 U.S.C.A. ?? 160, 1293 (1979 Supp.).
 64. Id. ? 1334. The district courts will also have jurisdiction of appeals from inter-
 locutory orders, but only by leave of the court. It is interesting to note that the district court
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 may be taken directly to the courts of appeals if all parties consent.65
 Magistrates' final judgments may be appealed directly to the courts of
 appeals just as if they were decisions by district judges.66 Alternatively, the
 parties may choose to appeal to the district court, which would not conduct
 a de novo review, but would apply normal appellate standards.67
 B. Constitutional Saving Devices
 Certain provisions of the new court systems incorporate safeguards that
 their proponents argued would ensure their constitutionality under article
 JJJ.68 For example, the contempt powers of bankruptcy judges are re-
 stricted,69 and the power of magistrates to try criminal cases is limited to
 "'misdemeanors" in keeping with the view that federal criminal penalties
 must ordinarily be imposed by an article III judge.70 In addition, the provi-
 sions for appellate review ensure that litigants who appear before bank-
 ruptcy judges and magistrates may receive supervision from article III courts
 at some stage of the proceedings.71
 Moreover, each Act employs a scheme of internal delegation of judicial
 power. Neither bankruptcy judges nor magistrates receive power to try
 article III cases directly from Congress. Instead, the jurisdiction contem-
 plated by each Act is vested, in the first instance, in the district courts and
 then transferred to the auxiliary legislative courts. Under the Bankruptcy
 Act this transfer is apparently mandatory; the Act confers the expanded
 bankruptcy jurisdiction on the district courts, but then provides that the
 bankruptcy courts "shall exercise all of the jurisdiction [so] conferred."72
 In contrast, the Magistrate Act authorizes district judges to designate a
 magistrate to exercise jurisdiction in any given case, provided the parties
 consent. Transfer of jurisdiction is thus discretionary with the court, rather
 than mandatory. Both systems of internal delegation are thought to cure
 possible constitutional defects, because Congress has not technically de-
 parted from the normal constitutional scheme of vesting jurisdiction in an
 article III court.73 In addition, employing article III courts as jurisdictional
 may not refer bankruptcy appeals to a magistrate. Id. ? 1334(c). This perhaps reflects Con-
 gress's recognition that bankruptcy litigants may be entitled to an article III judge at some
 stage of the proceedings.
 65. Id. ? 1293(b).
 66. Id. ?636(c)(3) (1980 Supp.).
 67. Id. ? 636 (c) (4).
 68. See notes 187-223 and accompanying text infra.
 69. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1481 (1979 Supp.). See, e.g., Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13,
 at 137 (testimony of Hon. Ruggiero Aldisert). See note 173 infra.
 70. 18 U.S.C.A. ? 3401(a) (1980 Supp.). See generally Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction,
 supra note 44 (constitutional problems with authorizing magistrates to hear criminal cases).
 71. See notes 197-202 and accompanying text infra.
 72. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1471(c) (1979 Supp.).
 73. See Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13, at 89 (testimony of Hon. Shirley
 Hufstedler), 137 (testimony of Hon. Ruggiero Aldisert), 217; Senate Hearings, supra note
 30, at 548-50 (testimony of Att'y Gen. Griffin Bell).
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 intermediaries ensures that the article I tribunals will remain subordinate in
 power and status.74
 The Magistrate Act incorporates an additional safeguard against con-
 stitutional challenge by requiring that magistrates exercise their expanded
 powers only upon the consent of the parties.75 Litigants who agree to trial
 before a magistrate will thereby waive whatever rights they possess to trial
 before an article III judge.76 The consent feature is thought to be a safe-
 guard on the theory that the requirement of an article III judge is no more
 than a due process right possessed by litigants, similar to other due process
 rights that have long been held to be waivable.77 In addition, consensual
 reference of cases to magistrates has been compared to the submission of
 disputes to arbitration or to special masters, practices that do not violate
 article II1.78
 Despite these precautions, the constitutionality of the new bankruptcy
 and magistrate systems remains problematic. By its terms, article III appears
 to require that all courts established by Congress comply with its require-
 ments. Accordingly, congressional power to delegate article III cases to
 legislative courts has always been construed narrowly. The Bankruptcy
 Reform Act and the Magistrate Act, however, permit non-article-III officers
 to exercise the broad civil jurisdiction customarily reserved for the article
 III district courts. Consequently, the compatibility of the new court systems
 with the existing doctrine of article I courts and the arguments advanced for
 their constitutionality must be scrutinized with special care.
 II. THE DOCTRINE OF ARTICLE I COURTS AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE
 BANKRUPTCY COURT AND MAGISTRATE SYSTEM
 The doctrine of legislative, or article I, courts recognizes that rigid
 adherence to the article III tenure and salary provisions may impair im-
 portant practical interests in governmental flexibility.79 For example, by
 precluding the discharge of federal judges once confirned in office, the ten-
 ure provision may effectively prevent Congress from disbanding a given
 tribunal once it has outlived its usefulness.80 Similarly, the salary provision
 74. See Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13, at 218 (statement of Att'y Gen.
 Griffin Bell); Forum, supra note 15, at 371-72.
 75. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 636(c) (1) (1980 Supp.).
 76. See note 169 and accompanying text infra.
 77. See note 202 and accompanying text infra.
 78. See, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957) (upholding use of
 special masters in dictum); DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499,
 504-05 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976) (consensual reference analogized
 to arbitration).
 79. See, e.g., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 396.
 80. Territorial courts provide an illustrative case in point. The impermanence of terri-
 torial status makes congressional flexibility to restructure or dismantle territorial judicial
 systems especially important. But, if territorial judges were guaranteed life tenure, Congress
 would be forced to absorb them into the federal judicial system when the territory entered the
 federal system, whether or not they were needed or qualified to be federal judges. See
 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545-47 (1962).
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 may prevent Congress from achieving needed economies.8' Both provisions
 thus restrict congressional flexibility to deal with changing circumstances.
 Moreover, because article III courts cannot hear cases outside the article
 III subject matter jurisdiction82 and cannot perform ministerial functions,83
 Congress may wish to establish legislative courts, which can adjudicate both
 article III cases 84 and non-article-Ill matters while performing an array of
 nonjudicial functions.85 Finally, through article I courts Congress can
 establish expert tribunals for particular types of cases and change their per-
 sonnel from time to time in order to preserve or enhance their expertise.86
 In short, by authorizing exceptions to the tenure and salary provisions, the
 doctrine of article I courts enables Congress to provide more flexible and
 effective mechanisms for resolving disputes than the article III requirements
 would permit.
 Although the doctrine of article I courts is well established, the Supreme
 Court has never marked the limits on congressional authority to establish
 non-article-Ill judicial tribunals.87 Taken as a whole, the Court's pro-
 nouncements in this area suggest Congress has broad power to create such
 courts in territories or special geographic areas such as federal enclaves, but
 much more limited authority within the United States itself.
 A. Territorial Article I Courts
 The Supreme Court first articulated the doctrine of legislative courts
 in the context of the territories in the 1828 case of American Insurance Co.
 81. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); O'Donoghue v. United
 States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933) (congressional efforts to curtail judicial salaries during the
 Depression); Will v. United States, 478 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (Congress must
 appropriate funds for cost-of-living increases for article III judges), juris. postponed, 100
 S.Ct. 1010 (1980) (No. 79-983).
 82. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 582 (1962); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
 Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (advisory opinions).
 In only one case, National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582
 (1949), has even a plurality of the Court ruled that article III courts can hear cases outside
 the article III subject matter jurisdiction. Six Justices, however, rejected this view, id. at 605,
 607 (Rutledge, J., concurring); id. at 643-44 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); id. at 646-49 (Frank-
 furter, J., dissenting), and it has not been asserted since.
 83. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 579-82 (1962) (article III Court of
 Customs and Patent Appeals may not render advice to tariff commission on rates); O'Donoghue
 v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 546 (1933).
 84. Article I courts may hear cases falling within the scope of article III jurisdiction.
 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), suggests that congressional allocation of article
 III judicial business to an article I court does not change the inherent nature of that busi-
 ness. Consequently, it is impossible to distinguish article III from article I courts on the
 ground that the former exercise the exclusive power to decide article III cases while the
 latter may only exercise judicial power in cases outside the scope of article III. See Hart
 & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 397 n.4.
 85. See Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 44243 (1923) (article I
 local District of Columbia courts may set utility rates in the District); C. Wright, supra note 1,
 ? 11, at 32.
 86. The Tax Court is an example of such a legislative court. See Bums, Stix Friedman
 & Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392 (1971).
 87. The Court expressly declined the opportunity to do so in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
 370 U.S. 530, 549 (1962).
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 v. Canter.88 Canter upheld the validity of an admiralty judgment rendered
 by a Florida territorial court comprised of untenured judges.89 Although
 one basis for the decision was that territorial courts are not constrained by
 article III because they do not exercise article III "judicial power,"90 the
 Court's main premise was that article IV granted Congress the combined
 powers of a local and a general government over the territories.9' This
 plenary sovereign power included the right to establish courts, which, like
 state courts, did not have to conform to article III requirements but could
 nonetheless exercise some of the subject matter jurisdiction described in
 article III, which includes admiralty cases.92
 The Court has applied similar reasoning to sustain article I courts in
 other geographical areas subject to exclusive congressional control, such as
 the District of Columbia.93 Palmore v. United States,94 the Court's most
 recent pronouncement on article I courts, upheld the constitutionality of the
 article I court system in the District of Columbia95 as a valid exercise of
 Congress's plenary sovereign power to legislate for that area. Responding
 to a claim that only a fully tenured article III judge could constitutionally
 try a criminal case arising under a District of Columbia law enacted by
 Congress, the Court emphasized that not all cases arising under federal lax-v
 must be heard by article III judges.96 Comparing the local District of
 88. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
 89. The losing party before the territorial court argued that because article III grants
 admiralty jurisdiction to federal courts, it was unconstitutional for a non-article-IIl court to
 resolve admiralty disputes. Id.
 90. Id. at 546. Chief Justice Marshall said that legislative courts were "incapable of
 receiving" article III judicial Dower. Id. In Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 578
 (1933), the Court interpreted this statement to forbid article I tribunals from hearing any
 cases within the jurisdictional scope of article III. This interpretation is plainly erroneous,
 because it overlooks the territorial underpinnings of Marshall's formulation of legislative
 courts. Justice Marshall was discussing the source of the power that authorizes a court, not
 the nature of the cases adjudicated by that court. See note 84 supra. State courts, for
 example, derive their power from state constitutions, and thus even when they are deciding
 federal question cases they are not exercising and are incapable of receiving the judicial power
 of the United States. Similarly, territorial courts receive their power from the plenary authority
 of Congress to function as a state government in that territory. They do not derive their
 power from the Congress acting in its national, federal capacity. They too, therefore, are
 incapable of receiving article III judicial power, and are not exercising this power when they
 adjudicate federal question cases. See Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts,
 88 Harv. L. Rev. 779, 782 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Masters and Magistrates].
 91. 26 U.S. at 546. U.S. Const. art. IV, ? 3, cl. 2, provides: "The Congress shall have
 Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
 or other Property belonging to the United States ...
 92. 26 U.S. at 546.
 93. Congress's power over the District derives from art. I, ? 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution.
 For cases upholding other "territorial" courts, see Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
 (1922) (courts in unincorporated territories outside the mainland United States); Stephens v.
 Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899) (United States court in Indian territory); United
 States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894) (court of private land claims in the western territories);
 In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (consular courts).
 94. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
 95. In 1970 Congress passed the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
 Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, which established separate local and federal
 courts in the District. The local court judges are appointed for 15-year terms, and their
 jurisdiction is similar to that of state judges. The federal courts in the District remain article
 III courts. See 411 U.S. at 392-93 & n.2.
 96. 411 U.S. at 401.
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 Columbia courts to state courts, it held that the defendant, who had violated
 a law of only local applicability, was no more entitled to an article III judge
 than any other criminal defendant in a state court.
 The reasoning of Canter and Palmore suggests that the territorial ra-
 tionale for article I courts is extremely limited97 and cannot sustain non-
 article-IIl courts established in areas that are not subject to the plenary
 authority of Congress. Other Supreme Court decisions suggest that any
 article I court established within the United States to hear a broad range of
 article III cases of national applicability would be unconstitutional.98 Under
 these precedents, the nationwide magistrate system is unconstitutional, be-
 cause it vests a full range of civil article III subject matter jurisdiction in
 article I officers. The only possibilities for saving the system's constitu-
 tionality are the features of litigant consent and internal delegation.99
 Similarly, since the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts may encompass a
 great variety of article III cases, they too appear to be unconstitutional under
 these precedents.
 B. Subject Matter Article I Courts-the Limits of the Doctrine
 Because its jurisdiction is tied to a specific subject of congressional
 power under article I, section 8,100 the bankruptcy court may be justified
 under a branch of the legislative court doctrine that permits the creation of
 non-article-Ill tribunals when "necessary and proper" to resolve cases aris-
 ing under the substantive powers conferred by article J.101 Thus, proponents
 97. Although the law violated in Palmore was passed by Congress, the case does not
 stand for the broad proposition that any case arising under federal law may be adjudicated
 by non-article-Ill officers. Cf. Campbell v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196, 201 (9th
 Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974) (apparently interpreting Palmore this broadly). This
 interpretation ignores the underlying territorial rationale for the decision in Palmore. See
 text accompanying notes 120-23 infra. Indeed, the Court stressed that the requirements of
 article III must apply "where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern
 are at stake," 411 U.S. at 408.
 98. 411 U.S. at 408. For example, in O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 539-45
 (1933), the Court indicated that when Congress establishes a permanent court exercising
 jurisdiction coextensive with that of other article III courts, Congress must adhere to the
 requirements of article III.
 99. For an analysis of the constitutional effect of these provisions, see notes 187-223 and
 accompanying text infra.
 100. U.S. Const. art. I, ? 8, cl. 4, empowers Congress "[t]o establish . . . uniform laws
 on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
 101. The source of congressional power to establish this type of legislative court is the
 "necessary and proper" clause, U.S. Const. art. I, ? 8, cl. 18, in conjunction with specific
 article I, ? 8, subject matter powers. See Masters and Magistrates, supra note 90, at 786,
 persuasively reasoning that since the jurisdiction of subject matter article I courts "necessarily
 encroaches upon that of article III tribunals which offer greater constitutional safeguards to
 litigants, the traditionally broad conception of 'necessary and proper' associated with
 McCulloch v. Maryland should be supplanted in this context by a much narrower view." Thus,
 Congress should be limited to " 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.'"
 Id. at 786-87 ((citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955)).
 When the functional needs supporting existing subject matter article I courts are examined,
 it is apparent that the conception of "necessary and proper" is indeed extremely narrow in
 this context. The "necessary and proper" rationale has been confined to subjects under
 exclusive executive or legislative control. See notes 118-26 and accompanying text infra.
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 of the bankruptcy court have likened it to the article I Tax Court'02 and
 Court of Military Appeals,'03 both of which have been held to be constitu-
 tional. When the jurisdiction exercised by the bankruptcy court is examined,
 however, it is apparent that it does not satisfy the limiting principles of the
 major theoretical justifications for these subject matter article I courts.
 1. The "Inherently Judicial" Test. Throughout the development of the
 doctrine of subject matter legislative courts, the Supreme Court's analysis
 has concentrated on the nature of the claims adjudicated by such tribunals.
 Thus, in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,104 the
 Court held that disputes between citizens and the federal government, as
 opposed to suits involving only private parties, could be assigned to legisla-
 tive courts. Similarly, in Ex Parte Bakelite Corp.,"05 it held that legislative
 courts may "examine and determine various matters, arising between the
 government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial
 determination and yet are susceptible of it.""06 Although the "public rights"
 rationale of Murray's Lessee and Bakelite may have been undermined by
 subsequent decisions,'07 the concept set forth in Bakelite that Congress can-
 not relegate "inherently judicial" matters to a legislative court 108 remains
 102. I.RC. ? 7441 (Tax Court an article I court). Although the Tax Court has upheld
 its own status, see Burns, Stix Friedman & Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392 (1971), the
 Supreme Court has never ruled on its constitutionality. It has denied certiorari from circuit
 court decisions sustaining the constitutionality of the Board of Tax Appeals, the administrative
 predecessor of the United States Tax Court. See Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commisioner,
 358 F.2d 636 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966); Martin v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d
 63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 920 (1966). However, an administrative tribunal within
 the Treasury Department, even one that performs a largely judicial function, does not present
 the same constitutional concerns as a full-fledged court, because "[t]he right of the United
 States to collect its internal revenue by summary administrative proceedings has long been
 settled." Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595 (1931). See note 182 and accompanying
 text infra.
 103. See, e.g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 686 (1973) (Court of Military Appeals
 an article I court); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969); United States ex rel.
 Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 (1955); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857).
 104. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). The issue in Murray's Lessee was whether Trea-
 sury officials could audit accounts of customs officials. The auditing was judicial in nature,
 and thus, it was argued, could only be performed by article III officers. The Court held
 that article III presented no bar to this "necessary and proper" exercise of Congress's tax
 collection power because it was a matter that, although capable of presentation in a judi-
 cially cognizable form, did not require resolution in a court. Congress was authorized to
 choose the manner of resolution for these controversies, which were not "from [their] na-
 ture, . . . the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty." Id. at 284.
 105. 279 U.S. 438 (1929). Bakelite held that the Court of Customs Appeals was an
 article I court. The case arose on a petition for a writ of prohibition to bar this court from
 hearing an appeal from findings of the Tariff Commission. These findings were ultimately
 subject to presidential review, which meant that the court's decision would only be advisory,
 and thus beyond the jurisdiction of an article III court. Article I courts, however, may
 render advisory opinions, because they are not subject to the jurisdictional "case or con-
 troversy" requirement of article III.
 106. Id. at 451.
 107. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (rejecting the Bakelite test and
 upholding the authority of an administrative tribunal to make factual determinations to
 resolve a dispute of private rights). See also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
 Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); Masters and Magistrates, supra note 90, at
 788; Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 44, at 713. The plurality opinion in
 Glidden, however, appears to reaffirm the Bakelite standard. See note 109 and accompanying
 text infra.
 108. 279 U.S. at 458.
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 valid today.'09 This "inherently judicial" test apparently marks the limit of
 Congress's power to establish subject matter article I courts.
 As elaborated by the Supreme Court, the "inherently judicial" test is
 primarily historical. If a particular type of controversy has traditionally
 been resolved by courts at common law or equity, rather than by the legis-
 lative or executive departments, then it is "inherently judicial" and must be
 heard in an article III court if heard in a federal court at all."10 Thus, for
 example, Ex Parte Bakelite Corp. held that suits concerning customs collec-
 tions could be assigned to an article I court because such matters had pre-
 viously been determined by Congress or by executive agencies,"' and there-
 fore were not inherently judicial. As a further example, under this historical
 rationale, criminal cases and any suit involving a right to a jury trial would
 be inherently judicial."12
 Implicit in the "inherently judicial" test as applied by the Supreme
 Court is the notion that the subject matter jurisdiction of these article I
 courts will be precisely delineated."83 When the range of matters that a
 court may hear is unlimited, rather than confined to a narrow class of cases
 on a particular subject matter, it would be virtually impossible to conclude
 that all such matters had been or could be relegated to executive or legislative
 decisionmakers. Thus, it is apparent that neither the magistrate system nor
 the bankruptcy court can be sustained under the "inherently judicial" test.
 The 1979 Magistrate Act contemplates no subject matter limits, other
 than article III's jurisdictional constraints, on the range of civil cases, in-
 cluding those requiring jury trial, that magistrates may resolve. Although
 magistrate trials have largely been confined in the past to particular types
 of habeas corpus and social security review cases,"4 the Act's unlimited
 109. In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), the Court, although overruling
 the result in Bakelite, indicated its approval of the "inherently judicial" test. Id. at 549.
 The constitutional status of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent
 Appeals was called into question in Glidden by the losing parties in federal district court
 proceedings over which judges of these courts had presided by designation. In holding these
 courts to be full-fledged article III courts, the Supreme Court concluded that the analytical
 error in Bakelite was the assumption that because Congress could have committed the matter
 to an article I court it must have created an article I court. Id. at 549-50.
 110. In Murray's Lessee the Court indicated that only those controversies that had re-
 quired judicial determination in England at the time the Constitution was adopted had to be
 adjudicated by an article III court. 59 U.S. at 284. See Masters and Magistrates, supra
 note 90, at 784.
 111. 279 U.S. at 457-58. Justice Harlan echoed this conclusion in Glidden, 370 U.S.
 at 549.
 112. See, e.g., Comment, The Distinction Between Legislative and Constitutional Courts
 and Its Effeot on Judicial Assignment, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 133, 159 n.172 (1962).
 113. The opinion in Bakelite stressed the limited subject matter jurisdiction of article
 I courts. See 279 U.S. at 452-59. Moreover, the Court justified the creation of the article
 I Court of Customs Appeals and Court of Claims as a legitimate exercise of the specific
 congressional powers to lay and collect import duties and to pay the debts of the United
 States. Id. at 452, 458. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 548.
 114. See, e.g., Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976) (review of administrative de-
 termination in Social Security benefit disputes). Discrimination cases are also frequently
 referred to magistrates. See, e.g., Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979) (sex-
 based employment discrimination challenged under 42 U.S.C. ? 1983 and 14th amendment);
 Horton v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (lst Cir. 1979) (title VII sex dis-
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 delegation scheme creates a basis for significant expansion of the practice.
 Indeed, as district court caseloads continue to rise, systemic pressures are
 likely to lead to an increasing number and wider range of cases referred to
 magistrates,"15 who will thus be hearing many "inherently judicial" matters
 heretofore decided only by judges.
 Bankruptcy matters have historically been resolved by courts rather
 than administrative agencies, because both summary and related plenary suits
 involve contract, debt, and property claims rooted in common law. Con-
 sequently, there will be a right to a jury trial in many cases heard by the
 new bankruptcy court."" Thus, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
 will comprise "inherently judicial" matters."7 Moreover, both bankruptcy
 judges and magistrates will hear many disputes between private citizens, so
 these court systems do not satisfy the "public rights" aspect of the Bakelite
 "inherently judicial" standard.
 2. The "Functional Need" Test. A second rationale for subject matter
 article I courts would permit Congress to create a legislative court whenever
 necessary to satisfy a special functional governmental need."18 According
 to this rationale, if it is "necessary" for the "proper" execution of a power
 committed to the legislative or executive branches that a matter be resolved
 outside the channels of the article III judiciary, Congress may constitutionally
 delegate the matter to an article I tribunal."19 Some commentators suggest
 that this test is derived from Palmore v. United States,120 where the Court
 said that the tenure and salary provisions may be disregarded only in order
 to "accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with re-
 spect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinc-
 tive treatment." 121 When analyzed in its proper "territorial court" context,
 however, it seems clear that Palmore did not adopt or approve this test. The
 case upheld a legislative court system established by Congress in the District
 of Columbia pursuant to its article I, section 8, power to govern the Dis-
 crimination case); Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1978) (discriminatory edu-
 cational practices).
 These referral patterns indicate that magistrates are too often employed to judge the
 claims of the poor and other traditionally under-represented, politically impotent societal
 groups.
 115. Institutional pressures for increased reliance on magistrates to alleviate overloaded
 dockets poses a risk of denial of article III judges to many federal litigants. See Article
 III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1049-50. This is a real risk, as evidenced by projections
 by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. See 1977 Hearings, supra note
 47, at 499.
 116. The new bankruptcy court is empowered to conduct jury trials. 28 U.S.C.A.
 ? 1480 (1979 Supp.).
 117. Bankruptcy matters are therefore "inherently judicial" under the Bakelite standard,
 because they have never been deemed susceptible of executive determination. See Bondurant,
 supra note 27, at 236; Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 916 (1930).
 118. See Masters and Magistrates, supra note 90, at 786.
 119. Id.
 120. 411 U.S. 389 (1973). See, e.g., Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 66 (letter
 from Prof. T. Sandalow to Rep. Peter Rodino).
 121. 411 U.S. at 408-09.
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 trict.122 The Court's remark about "specialized areas" seems directed solely
 at geographic areas, rather than particular subject matter areas.123
 A more appropriate precedential basis for this rationale are those Su-
 preme Court decisions analyzing the military court system.124 For example,
 the military courts have been justified on the basis of executive and congres-
 sional supremacy in military affairs and the special need for swift and flexible
 military discipline.125 The Court decisions examining the permissible scope of
 the military courts' authority indicate, however, that the "specialized need"
 justification for article I courts must be construed narrowly to avoid circum-
 venting article 111.126 The only "needs" justifying the bankruptcy and
 magistrate systems appear to be the imperatives to relieve district courts and
 resolve disputes more expeditiously.127 Although valid, these concerns
 hardly rise to the level of functional needs approved in prior Court deci-
 sions.128
 3. The "Necessary and Proper" Test and Administrative Agencies.
 Some commentators have advanced a third rationale for subject matter legis-
 lative courts, which suggests that Congress can create legislative courts
 whenever such tribunals are "necessary and proper" instruments for exer-
 cising any of the powers enumerated in article I, section 8.129 In essence,
 the argument holds that Congress can create a legislative court whenever it
 can create an administrative agency.130 The conceptual basis for this view
 is Congress's extensive power to select and limit remedies, which includes
 the power to select and shape the forum in which remedies may be ob-
 122. U.S. Const. art. 1, ? 8, cl. 17.
 123. See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 21.
 124. See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
 (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
 125. Masters and Magistrates, supra note 90, at 786 & n.48.
 126. The Court has held that civilians may not be court-martialed for crimes committed
 while soldiers, United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); civilian dependents
 of soldiers must be tried in article III courts, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); and that
 even soldiers are entitled to an article III court when charged with offenses that are not
 'service-connected." O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
 In limiting court-martial jurisdiction to situations clearly implicating special concerns
 of military discipline, the Court was motivated by the need to protect the jurisdiction of
 article III courts from encroachment. Justice Black warned of this possibility in United
 States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. at 15.
 127. See notes 15-22 & 35 and accompanying text supra.
 128. Palmore provides scant support for an "efficiency rationale" for article I courts,
 despite arguments to the contrary, see Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 66. In Palmore
 the Court emphasized that Congress considered the creation of the local court system neces-
 sary to ensure efficiency and speed and to relieve the caseload burden on courts hearing
 national matters. Congress was responding to similar problems of inefficiency, delay, and
 overwhelmed district courts when it proposed the new bankruptcy court system and the
 extension of magistrate's authority. The efficiency rationale, however, does not rise to the
 level of constitutional principle. Palmore did not offer the efficiency rationale as a justifica-
 tion for depriving federal judges of article III tenure and salary protection. The efficiency
 arguments were advanced in Palmore to explain why the local courts had been separated
 from the national tribunals, rather than to justify nontenured local judges. Comm. Print
 No. 3, supra note 5, at 23. The local article I courts upheld in Palmore were constitutional
 not because they were more efficient, but because Congress possessed general sovereign
 authority over the District of Columbia.
 129. See Masters and Magistrates, supra note 90, at 786.
 130. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 117, at 916-17.
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 tamed.'3' Its precedential basis is Crowell v. Benson,'32 which upheld
 the power of an administrative board of untenured federal conunissioners to
 determine private rights arising under federal law, subject to appellate re-
 view on points of law in an article III court.'33 Crowell has been read
 to permit creation of legislative courts to hear any federal question case,
 provided appellate review is available in an article III court.'34
 This argument is suspect on several grounds. First, Congress's power
 to select remedies does not automatically confer power to establish article I
 courts.'35 The language and purposes of article III require stringent limita-
 tions upon the latter power despite the general validity of the remedial
 power. Second, it mistakes the import of Crowell. The decision held
 that administrative agencies can constitutionally render binding determina-
 tions of fact.'36 Thus, the case stands only for the proposition that Congress
 can delegate factfinding to non-article-III officers under the necessary and
 proper clause, not that the clause permits broad delegation of article III
 decisionmaking power to non-article-Ill tribunals. In addition, the opinion
 emphasizes that factfinding is not an essential attribute of judicial power.137
 Thus, Crowell provides virtually no support for the view that Congress can
 freely delegate federal question cases to legislative courts.138
 Moreover, in relying on administrative agencies as precedents for
 article I courts, this argument gives inadequate weight to the functional dif-
 ferences between agencies and courts. In establishing administrative agen-
 cies pursuant to its power over remedies, Congress has not endowed them
 with judicial power, which may be defined as the ultimate decisionmaking
 core of the adjudicative function.'39 The exercise of judicial power encom-
 131. Congressional authority to select and limit remedies has been sustained under Con-
 gress's general power to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts. See Hart & Wechsler,
 supra note 27, at 316-22, 332-34.
 Professor Hart argues in his famous dialogue, however, that congressional power to
 regulate jurisdiction by defining remedies is necessarily limited by greater constitutional
 principles, such as due process. Id. at 332-35.
 132. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
 133. Crowell arose under the Longshoreman and Harborworkers' Compensation Act.
 Prior to the Act the compensation claim adjudicated by the agency would have been
 brought as a common law tort action, in which liability would turn on legal determinations,
 such as whether a duty of care had been violated. Under the Act, liability turned solely
 on factual determinations, such as whether the seaman was in the employ of the shipowner
 and whether he was performing duties on navigable waters. Crowell therefore does not
 imply that common law legal disputes may be resolved by administrative agencies.
 134. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 5, at 1316-17.
 135. See note 131 and accompanying text supra.
 136. The Court emphasized that de novo review of all legal determinations would be
 available in an article III court. 285 U.S. at 56-57.
 137. Id. at 51. In support of this conclusion the Court cited the use of juries and
 special masters to assist judges with factfinding. See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Bankers
 Trust Co., 318 U.S. 163 (1943).
 138. Indeed, the Court itself later limited Crowell as merely "accept[ing] factfinding by
 an administrative agency . . . only as an adjunct to an Art. III court" similar to a jury or
 special master. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
 442, 450 n.7 (1977).
 139. Cases discussing the permissible scope of magistrates' authority have developed
 several formulations of the term "judicial power." See, e.g., Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
 261, 270 (1976) (magistrate's role not inconsistent with article III because authority for
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 passes far more than making factual determinations.140 At its minimum it
 involves rendering binding decisions on points of law that affect or alter the
 rights and obligations of parties and establish precedents for future litigants.
 It also encompasses certain coercive powers, such as the power to render
 self-executing judgments or to cite for contempt. Administrative agencies
 possess neither of these attributes. Although they can adjudicate questions
 of law,'41 their decisions are not final, but subject to review in article III
 courts.'42 Similarly, although agencies can issue coercive orders, they can
 making final decisions remains with district judge); Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 485-86
 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (ultimate decisionmaking power is judicial function that can-
 not be delegated to magistrate); Horton v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403, 404
 (lst Cir. 1979) (discretionary authority to enter final judgment is fundamentally an exclusive
 power of article III courts); Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1978)
 (retention of ultimate decisionmaking function in article III judges avoids constitutional
 infirmities with magistrates' role); Reciprocal Exch. v. Noland, 542 F.2d 462, 463 (8th Cir.
 1976) (article III forbids judges from delegating final decisionmaking authority). See Article
 III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1032 n.50.
 It has traditionally been asserted that administrative agencies may not pass on the
 constitutionality of statutes. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975). One
 commentator, however, has suggested that agencies should be permitted to make constitu-
 tional determinations when several factors, such as a normal agency policymaking role and
 adequate record-developing procedures, are present. Note, The Authority of Administrative
 Agencies to Consider the Constitutionality of Statutes, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1682 (1977). The
 author of the Note dismisses article III objections by arguing that judicial review is always
 available, permitting "the independent judiciary adequately to fill its assigned role." Id. at
 1686. This argument shares the flaw of the broad reading of Crowell v. Benson discussed
 earlier, in that it wrongly construes article III's requirements as applicable only to appellate
 tribunals. More generally, it does not give sufficient consideration to the important policy
 reasons for the tenure and salary guarantees in article III. See notes 153-69 and accompany-
 ing text infra.
 140. As the Court emphasized in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932), factfinding
 is not an essential attribute of the judicial power. Thus, juries, special masters, and ad-
 ministrative tribunals are constitutionally valid.
 141. See, e.g., O'Leary v. Brown-Pacfic-Maxon, Inc. 340 U.S. 504 (1951); NLRB v.
 Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941), in
 which administrative tribunals interpreted the meaning of statutory terms to determine
 whether they covered a particular situation.
 142. See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise ? 3:10 (2d ed. 1978). Although in
 his 1978 Treatise Professor Davis writes that agencies exercise "judicial power," id., he uses
 the term to mean the ability to find facts from evidence and apply the law to these facts.
 He does not use "judicial power" in the sense in which this Note uses the term-the ultimate
 coercive authority to render a binding legal judgment.
 Some statutes preclude judicial review of certain agency actions completely or condition
 its availability on the exhaustion of administrative remedies. See, e.g., 4 K. Davis, Adminis-
 trative Law Treatise ?? 28.01-.21 1958 ed. & 1980 Supp. The Supreme Court has sustained such
 provisions even in the selective service context, where lack of judicial review may result in unjust
 deprivation of liberty. See, e.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); Falbo v.
 United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944) (draft registrants prosecuted for failure to report for
 induction may not challenge validity of their draft classification as defense unless adminis-
 trative remedies exhausted). The courts were not totally deprived of their constitutional
 role by the selective service schemes in these cases, however. Habeas corpus was still avail-
 able as a means for reviewing the agency action. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at
 342-44.
 When judicial review is precluded by a statute, it is usually in the area of discretionary
 agency actions. See 4 K. Davis, supra, at 104. Even if a statute purports to deny judicial
 review, however, there may still be recourse to the courts. The individual affected by the
 agency action may refuse to obey it, and may then assert his defenses in a subsequent judicial
 enforcement proceeding. See note 143 infra; Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 320-21,
 342-44. The courts thus exercise their essential role in assuring that the law remains
 supreme over agency discretion.
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 enforce them only with the aid of an article III court.'43 Administrative
 agencies do not, therefore, provide a precedent for broad-scale creation of
 legislative courts.
 A final difficulty with the "necessary and proper" argument as a stan-
 dard for the limit on congressional power to establish subject matter article
 I courts is that it is not actually a test, but merely an explanation of why the
 legislative court doctrine came into existence.144 Indeed, a "limit" that
 would allow Congress to create a legislative court pursuant to any article
 I, section 8, power is no limit at all.145 If all that was needed to justify an
 article I court was a congressional power to legislate for the subject matter
 area, Congress would be able to make a wholesale delegation of federal
 question jurisdiction to article I courts. Legislative authority over a subject
 matter should not render article III inoperative for cases involving that area.
 Otherwise, the principle of separation of powers embodied in the constitu-
 tional framework could be circumvented at the will of Congress.
 C. The Need for a New Approach to Article I Courts
 Although the magistrate system and the bankruptcy court exceed the
 limits on article I tribunals that can be gleaned from precedent, this does not
 necessarily resolve the issue of their constitutionality. The Supreme Court
 has never indicated the full scope of congressional authority in this area,
 and its pronouncements thus far offer unsatisfactory guidance.
 For example, the "inherently judicial" test is largely unresponsive to the
 question of Congress's ultimate authority to establish legislative courts
 within the states. The test is primarily historical-it assumes that if a mat-
 ter was once resolved by executive or legislative officers rather than the
 courts, Congress may disregard the apparently mandatory tenure and salary
 provisions once it delegates the matter to the federal courts. The inapplica-
 bility of the article III provisions in the absence of federal court jurisdiction,
 however, does not necessarily render them inapplicable once jurisdiction is
 conferred. Article III was not implicated when the matter was resolved
 within the executive branch, but it is implicated once the matter comes
 within the province of the federal judiciary. For example, the "public
 143. The authority of administrative agencies to impose civil penalties was established
 in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occunational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
 The Court held that when Congress created new "public rights" under regulatory statutes,
 the seventh amendment did not bar Congress from committing factfinding and enforcement
 of these rights to administrative agencies.
 See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), in which the Court
 held that the seventh amendment did not prevent the NLRB from deciding whether unfair
 labor practices, as defined by statute, had occurred. Under the administrative adjudication
 schemes upheld in both Atlas Roofing and Jones & Laughlin, however, judicial review was
 available and the agencies had to institute collection or enforcement proceedings in court
 if the violator did not voluntarily comply with the administrative order.
 144. See notes 79-86 and accompanying text supra.
 145. See, e.g., Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 23-24. The jurisdiction of the new
 bankruptcy court is a pertinent example of the expansiveness of this "limit." See notes
 27 & 28 and accompanying text supra.
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 rights" cases in which the test was first presented were traditionally resolved
 by the political branches because the doctrine of sovereign immunity pre-
 vented article III courts from hearing them.146 But once sovereign immunity
 is lifted such cases fall within the article III subject matter jurisdiction.
 Accordingly, allocation of such cases to a legislative court raises the same
 constitutional questions as would any allocation of article III cases to a non-
 article-III federal tribunal. Thus, the "inherently judicial" test, which looks
 to past practice, offers little guidance concerning the future scope of con-
 gressional power to circumvent article III's tenure and salary provisions.
 The argument relying on administrative agencies as precedents similarly
 begs the question, because agencies do not implicate the policies of article
 III to the same extent as legislative courts. Administrative adjudication is
 essentially an extension of the legislative or executive function-the judicial
 branch has not yet been brought into play. The provisions and policies of
 article III are not invoked until a tribunal is actually endowed with "judicial
 power."
 Finally, although the "functional need" test properly recognizes the
 governmental interests underlying the doctrine of article I courts,147 it pro-
 vides no satisfactory criteria for determining when the needs of a particular
 subject area are sufficiently "special" to warrant overriding the requirements
 of article III. Presumably, a legislative findinrg of necessity would effectively
 bind the courts; yet if the legislature can define necessity in this sense, then
 very likely it could extend the "functional need" formulation almost as
 broadly as it could the "necessary and proper" argument, with a similar
 weakening of article III policies. Thus the test does not provide a satis-
 factory principle for limiting the doctrine of legislative courts.
 These suggested limits are ultimately unsatisfactory for answering the
 question of how far Congress may go in ignoring article III's requirements
 because they fail to consider the constitutional policies embodied in that
 article. Resolving a question of conflict with a constitutional provision,
 however, should properly begin with an analysis of the purposes of the pro-
 vision involved. The next section examines the policies of article III in
 order to formulate a more satisfactory limit on congressional power to estab-
 lish article I courts.
 ITT. ARTICLE III LIMITS ON THE CREATION OF ARTICLE I COURTS
 Congress has broad power to control federal court jurisdiction.'48 In-
 deed, it is not obliged to create any inferior federal courts,'49 and may
 146. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); Masters and Magistrates,
 supra note 90, at 785.
 147. See notes 79-86 and accompanying text supra.
 148. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850); Hart & Wechsler,
 supra note 27, at 309-24.
 149. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 81 (A. Hamilton); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
 530, 551 (1962).
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 abolish federal question jurisdiction altogether.150 When it does establish
 a federal court, however, the terms of article III appear to be mandatory.'5'
 At the very least, article III should be the norm for federal courts,152 and
 the scope of congressional power to delegate jurisdiction to non-article-III
 tribunals should be carefully limited to preserve the constitutional policies
 embodied in the norm.
 A. The Policies Underlying the Tenure and Salary Provisions in Article III
 Like most of the compromises that emerged from the Constitutional
 Convention, the tenure and salary provisions of article III serve a number of
 purposes in the constitutional scheme of government. Well aware of the
 evils that flow from excessive concentrations of power, the Framers sought
 to limit the total power of the national government by allocating distinct
 portions of the national power to separate governmental branches and by
 structuring relations among the branches so that the operations of each
 would confine the others to their proper spheres.153 The tenure and salary
 provisions in article III are among the checks and balances that preserve
 this separation of powers. The provisions ensure that the legislative and
 executive branches will not be able to dominate the judiciary through coer-
 cive manipulation of judges' livelihood and continuance in office.154 More-
 over, by freeing judges from political influence, article III enables the
 judiciary to prevent the political branches from infringing individual rights
 or otherwise exceeding their powers.'55 Thus, by securing the independence
 of the judiciary the tenure and salary requirements help maintain the proper
 allocation of power among the branches of the national government.
 Perhaps less obvious, but no less important, is the role of the tenure
 and salary provisions in preserving the balance of power between the national
 150. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1973); Sheldon v. Sill,
 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
 151. See note 1 and accompanying text supra; Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, supra
 note 44, at 711-12.
 152. See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 33, 49 (letter from Prof. Herbert Wechsler
 to Rep. Peter Rodino).
 153. See, e.g., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 2-13 (summarizing the proceedings
 at the Constitutional Convention regarding the role of the judiciary).
 154. See The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (judicial function of checking other
 branches requires tenure and salary guarantees in article III); Hart & Wechsler, supra note
 27, at 9-11.
 The Framers' abhorrence of a servile judiciary was attested to in the Declaration of
 Independence, where one of the listed usurpations of the king was that he had "made
 judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and pay-
 ment of their salaries."
 155. See The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) ("The independence of judges is equally
 requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals ....").
 Judicial independence is all the more vital today, because the federal courts are in-
 creasingly called upon to resolve disputes over the basic structures of our society's institu-
 tions and its allocations of wealth and power. Kaufman, supra note 59, at 681-90. For
 example, judges have been asked to make decisions in the politically sensitive areas of
 abortion, affirmative action, school desegregation, prison reform, and public welfare. See,
 e.g., Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 Colum.
 L. Rev. 784, 788-89 (1978).
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 government and the states. The Framers envisioned a limited national
 government that would operate upon objects of national concern, but would
 not displace the legitimate functions of state governments.'56 Thus, al-
 though the Framers charged the federal judiciary with safeguarding federal
 interests and maintaining the supremacy of federal law,'57 they also sought
 to ensure that federal courts would not interfere with the legitimate opera-
 tions of state judicial systems.'58 Implicit in the limited grant of federal
 subject matter jurisdiction, this concern for the interests of federalism also
 underlies the tenure and salary provisions of article III. An independent
 judiciary not only can confine the p-olitical branches to their respective
 spheres, but also can check those branches should they encroach upon the
 states' domains.'59 By assuring an impartial and independent forum for
 suits concerning the states, the tenure and salary provisions ensure that any
 limitation of state prerogatives will occur by proper operation of law, rather
 than through legislative or executive coercion. Similarly, by securing an
 impartial federal forum insulated from influence by the states, the provisions
 help retain the supremacy of federal interests in the federal scheme.'60 The
 tenure and salary provisions of article III therefore help advance the vital
 constitutional principle of federalism.
 Furthermore, the provisions protect and promote the integrity of the fed-
 eral judiciary as an institution. By insulating the judiciary from influence by
 the political branches, the provisions safeguard judicial impartiality.'"' Thus
 they facilitate accurate decisionmaking, assure proper protection for individual
 rights,'62 attract the most highly qualified persons to the bench,'63 and en-
 hance public confidence in the federal courts.'64
 In addition, by incorporating the strict impeachment standard of article
 II, section 4,165 the tenure guarantee protects individual judges from the
 156. For a recent articulation of the principle of federalism, see National League of
 Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See also Justice Frankfurter's discussion of federalism
 and its effect on the structuring of the federal judiciary in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tide-
 water Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646-48 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
 157. See The Federalist No. 22 (A. Hamilton) (judiciary's primary task of providing
 for the effective enforcement of federal laws includes protecting federal interests against
 competing state claims).
 158. Fear that state courts might be displaced by the federal judiciary was expressed
 when the Constitutional Convention considered proposals for the establishment of inferior
 federal courts. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 11-12, 21-23.
 This fear also led to the provision in art. III, ? 2, limiting the subject matter jurisdic-
 tion of federal courts. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582,
 646-48 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
 159. Cf. The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (federal courts are the "bulwarks of a
 limited Constitution against legislative encroachments" on both states' and individuals' rights).
 160. See Article III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1032 n.55.
 161. The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (security of tenure designed "to secure a
 steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws").
 162. Id. (independent judges necessary "to guard the Constitution and the rights of
 individuals").
 163. Id.; Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 44, at 701.
 164. Id.; Senate Hearings, supra note 30, at 129 (testimony of Ass't Att'y Gen. F.M.
 Vinson, Jr.).
 165. U.S. Const. art. II, ? 4, provides that judges may only be removed for "high crimes
 and misdemeanors." See note 2 supra.
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 exertion of improper influences, disguised as disciplinary measures, by their
 colleagues, and thus ensures judicial individualism.166 This is an important
 value to preserve, because it enables federal judges to criticize old doctrines
 and explore new principles, thereby facilitating the law's ability to develop
 in response to changing conditions.'67 Orthodoxy and consistency in the
 law are properly maintained not through disciplinary measures, but through
 orderly processes of precedential reasoning and appellate review.168 By se-
 curing an able, impartial, and diverse bench, the article III provisions ensure
 that the federal judiciary will effectively perform its role in the constitutional
 scheme of government.
 The tenure and salary guarantees also serve values of due process, be-
 cause by preserving judicial independence and impartiality they protect
 federal litigants. Indeed, some commentators have argued that article III's
 requirements are no more than a matter of due process.'69 They base their
 suggestion on Justice Brandeis's dissent in Crowell v. Benson, where he argued
 that cases could be delegated freely to legislative courts except when "the
 constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial pro-
 cess."'70
 However, the decision in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok'7' strongly suggests
 that article III involves more than due process. Glidden involved judges
 166. Kaufman, supra note 59, at 711-14.
 167. The Supreme Ciurt attested to this principle in Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398
 U.S. 74 (1970), which involved a district judge's challenge to the judicial council's authority
 to regulate judicipl business in the district. Although it avoided defining the scope of the
 council's power over district judges, the Court said it was an established principle that
 independence is required "in any phase of the decisional function." Id. at 84. The Court
 was referring to independence from influence by other judges, rather than independence from
 the ther branches. See Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 44, at 703. Justice
 Douglas dissented in Chandler because he thought the Court should reach the merits, but
 he did clarify the Court's concern with independence from other judges. A federal judge,
 he wrote, must be "independent of every other judge . . .. [N]either one alone nor any
 number banded together can act as censor and place sanctions on him." 398 U.S. at 136
 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Kaufman, supra note 59, at 714.
 168. Kaufman, supra note 59, at 707.
 169. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 5, at 1340-60, 1366. Cf. Tushnet, Invitation to a
 Wedding: Some Thoughts on Article III and a Problem of Statutory Interpretation, 60 Iowa
 L. Rev. 937, 943-44 (1975) (suggesting that Palmore implies article III is merely a due pro-
 cess requirement).
 170. 285 U.S. at 87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See, e.g., TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460
 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir. 1972) (due process of law encompasses right of litigants to have
 "cases" or "controversies" determined by article III judges). Chief Justice Burger has also
 intimated that there is a due process right to an article III judge, which is satisfied so long
 as a judge retains final decisionmaking authority in cases handled by magistrates, Wingo v.
 Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 486 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
 Justice Brandeis's view was echoed in hearings on the 1968 Magistrates Act, where the
 bill's sponsor argued that consent of the parties would vitiate any constitutional problems
 with magistrate trial of minor criminal offenses, because "[i]f any 'right' to trial by [an
 article 1111 judge exists, it is a due process right, which is waivable like other due process
 rights." Hearings on S. 945 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
 of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1967) (testimony of Sen.
 Tydings).
 It has been suggested that the due process right to an article III judge is linked to
 the seventh amendment guarantee to a trial by jury. See TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d
 348, 354-55 n.37 (7th Cir. 1972). Under Justice Brandeis's formulation in Crowell, for
 example, where there is a right to trial by jury there is arguably a "requirement of judicial
 process."
 171. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
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 of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which
 previously had been held to be article I courts,'72 who had presided by
 designation over trials in article III courts. The Supreme Court allowed the
 results of these trials to stand only because it held that the judges were in-
 deed article III judges. In reaching this holding the Court indicated that
 article I judges may not bind litigants in article III courts, no matter how
 impeccably they conduct the proceedings.'73 Indeed, Justice Harlan, writing
 for the plurality, took pains to praise the qualifications, fairness, and im-
 partiality of the judges involved.'74 Due process was obviously satisfied by
 the proceedings below; thus, if article III were nothing more than a due pro-
 cess requirement, Justice Harlan could have dismissed the case after noting
 the fair proceedings provided by the article I judges.
 Although the tenure and salary provisions parallel the due process
 guarantee of fundamental fairness to a certain extent, article III chiefly pro-
 tects larger structural concerns that due process addresses only incidentally.
 For example, due process might readily be satisfied in trials before a legisla-
 tive court even though the existence of the court itself greatly jeopardized
 constitutional policies concerning the distribution of governmental power.
 Thus, the fundamental error with the argument that the provisions of article
 III only create due process rights in litigants is that it ignores the larger
 institutional concerns underlying the protections of judicial independence.
 These concerns are intimately related to the preservation of judicial
 independence and thus of the distribution of power under our constitutional
 system. They cannot be lightly disregarded.'75 Consequently, if establish-
 ment of a particular legislative court would jeopardize constitutional policies
 of separation of powers, federalism, and judicial integrity, then article III
 should apply to render the court unconstitutional. If, however, the existence
 of the court has no bearing on these constitutional policies, then article III
 is irrelevant and the court should be upheld as a valid exercise of Congress's
 power to establish article I courts.
 172. Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (Court of Claims); Ex Parte Bak-elite
 Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929) (Court of Customs Appeals).
 173. Justice Harlan noted that although there had been no denial of "independent judi-
 cial hearings," article III "is explicit and gives the petitioners a basis for complaint without
 requiring them to point to particular instances of mistreatment." 370 U.S. at 533.
 Justice Douglas, dissenting, expressed concern over the qualification of non-article-Ill
 judges to exercise judicial power:
 Judges who sit on Article I courts are chosen for administrative or allied skills,
 not for their qualifications to sit in cases involving the vast interests of life, liberty,
 or property for whose protection the Bill of Rights and the other guarantees in the
 main body of the Constitution, including the ban on bills of attainder and ex post
 facto laws, were designed. Judges who might be confirmed for an Article I court
 might never pass muster for the onerous and life-or-death duties of Article III
 judges.
 Id. at 606 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
 174. Id. at 533.
 175. The importance of the requirements in article III has led one commentator to
 suggest that the entire doctrine of article I courts is constitutionally dubious. See Comment,
 supra note 112, at 148-50. Although the concept of article I courts is probably too well
 entrenched to be discarded, its shaky constitutional underpinnings do require strict construc-
 tion of the limits on the doctrine's scope.
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 This article III policy analysis is both manageable by courts and pro-
 perly sensitive to legislative prerogatives. Discovery and analysis of legal
 policies is peculiarly within the judicial province, and courts can easily iden-
 tify the policies of article III and determine their relevance in a given case.
 Moreover, by requiring courts to consider constitutional policies, rather than
 the validity of the "special need" advanced by the legislature to justify a
 particular tribunal, this analysis maintains proper judicial deference to legis-
 lative judgments. When Congress establishes a tribunal endowed with the
 essential attributes of judicial power to adjudicate article III cases, the courts
 must determine whether article III policies are contravened; if they are not,
 or if the tribunal lacks the essential characteristics of a federal court, the
 judicial inquiry should end unless other constitutional principles are involved.
 Thus, the proposed analysis enables both the judiciary and the political
 branches to perform their proper tasks.
 Application of the article III policy analysis to existing legislative
 courts demonstrates its utility for resolving the question of their constitu-
 tionality. Under this analysis, legislative courts established in United
 States territories and other federal enclaves such as the District of Columbia
 appear to be constitutional. In such regions, the federal government must
 perform not only its usual functions as a national government, but also the
 varied and specialized functions undertaken within the states by state and
 local governments.176 Thus, Congress must establish a judicial system that
 can exercise not only the article III subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
 courts, but also the broad general jurisdiction, not limited to article Ill cases,
 exercised by the state courts. Only through the device of legislative courts
 can Congress establish territorial tribunals with the necessary breadth of
 jurisdiction.'77
 Moreover, unlike legislative courts within the states, territorial courts
 do not implicate the policies of the article III tenure and salary provisions.
 First, territorial judicial systems are not charged with preserving the separa-
 tion of powers, because the Constitution explicitly commits the governance
 of territories and federal enclaves to the sole discretion of Congress.'78 With
 the legislature thus supreme, an article III judiciary is unnecessary to preserve
 the role of the other branches, and could actually impede the legislature in
 discharging its own role. Second, considerations of federalism are irrelevant
 in the territories, because Congress does not act against a background of state
 law in legislating for these regions. An article III judiciary is therefore
 unnecessary to prevent federal displacement of state legal systems.179 Final-
 ly, because territorial courts play no part in preserving the structure of our
 176. See notes 79, 88-92 and accompanying text supra.
 177. See Comment, supra note 112, at 150 (arguing that territorial courts are constitutional
 because article III is inapplicable in the territories).
 178. U.S. Const. art. IV, ? 3, cl. 2.
 179. See, e.g., Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 21.
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 limited constitutional government, they need not enjoy the extraordinary
 safeguards provided by the tenure and salary requirements.'80
 The military court system can also be constitutionally justified under
 an article III policy analysis. Military courts hear only prosecutions of
 servicemen for service-connected violations of the special code of military
 law. Because the jurisdiction of these courts is sharply restricted to service-
 connected matters over which the political branches have pnmary con-
 trol,18' they do not threaten the separation of powers; indeed, extensive
 judicial intervention in military affairs might itself endanger the legitimate
 prerogatives of the other branches. Similarly, because the states play no
 role in military matters, military courts do not offend policies of federalism.
 In fact, given the restriction of military jurisdiction to service-connected
 matters, military courts closely resemble courts in federal enclaves and thus
 pose little more threat to article III policies than do territorial courts.'82
 B. Article III Limits Applied to the Bankruptcy and Magistrate Systems
 Because the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and magistrates will
 encompass a broad range of article III cases, these systems inevitably
 threaten the framework of federalism and separation of powers guarded by
 article III.
 With respect to the bankruptcy system, although Congress has the legis-
 lative authority to promulgate uniform bankruptcy rules of national applica-
 bility,'83 it has always been the province of the article III judiciary to in-
 180. Professor Wright argues, however, that judicial independence is as vital in the
 territories as in the states. He points out that because territorial judges try federal criminal
 cases and resolve matters involving the United States, it is undesirable that they are dependent
 on the Department of Justice for continued tenure. Instances of nonreappointment as a
 reprisal for unpopular decisions are not unknown in the territories. C. Wright, supra note
 1, at 37.
 181. The Supreme Court has limited court-martial jurisdiction to service-connected
 violations committed by noncivilians on military bases. See note 126 and accompanying
 text supra.
 182. It is a somewhat closer question whether the Tax Court comports with article III
 policies. See Dubroff, Federal Taxation, in 1973-1974 Ann. Survey Am. L. 265, 272-85.
 Because the Tax Court adjudicates suits for refunds of federal taxes it poses concrete threats
 to the separation of powers. By dominating a tribunal that so directly affects the public
 fisc either of the political branches might invade the province of the other. Similarly, be-
 cause federal taxation affects state tax revenues, domination of the Tax Court might jeop-
 ardize federalism concerns. Furthermore, the absence of article III guarantees of judicial
 integrity seems particularly incongruous in a tribunal that adjudicates claims between citizens
 and government. In light of the "checking and balancing" purpose of the tenure and salary
 provisions, adherence to them would seem more-not less-necessary in such a tribunal.
 Masters and Magistrates, supra note 90, at 785.
 On the other hand, however, the Tax Court does not exercise the full range of judicial
 power. The court cannot enter binding judgments, but simply declares the amount a tax-
 payer owes. It lacks the coercive powers of article III courts. See Burns, Stix Friedman
 & Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392, 396 (1971). Thus, in function if not in name, it is
 little more than an administrative agency and poses no greater threat to article III policies
 than do those nonjudicial tribunals.
 183. U.S. Const. art. 1, ? 8, cl. 4.
 This subject matter authority alone does not authorize Congress to create a non-article-
 III court, however. See notes 144 & 145 and accompanying text supra. Nor does the
 determination that this congressional power can be implemented most effectively in a court
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 terpret and apply these rules to assure uniformity. The judicial role in
 bankruptcy cases involves balancing competing legal rights of private citizens
 and reconciling the often conflicting statutory policies of rehabilitating
 debtors and satisfying creditors. If Congress can constitutionaliy create a
 bankruptcy tribunal whose judges are beholden to it for their salary and
 continuance in office, it is likely that Congress will be able to exert virtually
 unchecked control over bankruptcy policy, at the expense of individual pro-
 perty rights. Such a result would upset the delicate separation of powers
 framework, which looks to the judiciary to protect individual rights from
 congressional encroachment.
 The federalism concerns underlying article III's requirements are
 threatened by the bankruptcy court because its jurisdiction will encom-
 pass many claims grounded solely in state law.184 In bankruptcy pro-
 ceedings, the role of federal law is merely to appoint an administrator
 of private assets and to provide a federal forum for such actions. The pri-
 vate assets themselves, however, include state causes of action.'85 The
 tenure and salary protections in article III are therefore important in the
 bankruptcy context, because by ensuring judicial independence they limit the
 extent to which the political branches of the federal government can use the
 judiciary to encroach upon state-created rights.
 The Magistrate Act undermines the separation of powers principle by
 vesting judicial power of a scope equal to that of district judges in deci-
 sionmakers whose term of office and level of compensation are controlled
 by Congress. It is also incompatible with principles of federalism to the
 extent that it empowers article I officers to overturn state court judgments on
 habeas corpus petitions and resolve competing claims of state-created rights
 in diversity cases. When the states grudgingly relinquished some of their
 judicial prerogatives to the federal system, far from sanctioning or even en-
 visioning decisionmaking power exercised by "parajudges" subject to con-
 gressional control, they insisted on the requirements and limitations in article
 JJT.186
 staffed by specialists and separate from the overburdened district courts amount to a "spe-
 cialized functional need" justifying article I status. As Professor Wechsler has pointed out,
 the "particularized need" test in Palmore does not authorize an article I bankruptcy court,
 because
 the fact that Article I delegates authority to Congress to "establish . . . uniform
 laws on the subject of bankruptcies . . ." does not without more permit the ad-
 ministration of such laws by federal courts unprotected by the tenure provisions of
 Article III. The bankruptcy power is no different in this respect than the power
 to regulate commerce or any other source of national legislation.'
 Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 25.
 184. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
 185. See Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
 Laws-Tax Procedures, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1360, 1468 (1975).
 186. One commentator has noted that magistrates are sensitive to possible resentment
 by state judges who are overturned by a mere magistrate, and thus may be more reluctant
 than federal judges to grant post-conviction relief to state prisoners. Shapiro, Federal Habeas
 Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 366-67 (1973). In light of these
 subtle pressures, a further expansion of magistrates' civil adjudicatory authority, which will
 inevitably encompass even more state prisoner habeas petitions and civil rights actions against
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 The general federal jurisdiction of the article I bankruptcy court and
 the magistrate system cannot be reconciled with article III, because it con-
 flicts with the all-important values of federalism and the separation of
 powers. Consequently, unless their provisions for internal delegation of
 jurisdiction, appellate review in article III courts, and litigant consent to an
 article I judge actually mitigate the conflicts with these constitutional policies,
 the new bankruptcy court and the expanded civil jurisdiction of magistrates
 must be deemed unconstitutional. The following section examines the effect
 of these so-called saving devices.
 IV. INTERNAL DELEGATION, APPELLATE REVIEW, AND LITIGANT CONSENT:
 DO THEY MAKE THE BANKRUPTCY COURT AND MAGISTRATE ACT
 CONSTITUTIONAL?
 A. Internal Delegation
 Some proponents of the bankruptcy court and the expanded adjudi-
 catory role of magistrates have argued that no separation of powers prob-
 lems exist because jurisdiction is still vested in article III courts, with
 magistrates and bankruptcy judges directly controlled by judges, rather than
 Congress.187 This rationale collapses when applied to the new magistrate
 system, since under that system district judges no longer conduct a de novo
 review of a magistrate's recommendation, and a magistrate can enter a final,
 binding judgment. Jurisdiction thus remains vested in the district court in
 name only.'88 This defect is even more apparent in the bankruptcy scheme,
 where district judges do not even have discretion to retain a bankruptcy
 case.'89 To argue that the device of internal delegation satisfies constitu-
 tional concerns is to exalt form over substance.
 state officials under 42 U.S.C. ? 1983, may result in a dilution of individual constitutional
 rights.
 187. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1968); Bankruptcy
 Court Hearings, supra note 13, at 89 (testimony of Hon. Shirley Hufstedler), 216-18 (statement
 of Att'y Gen. Gr-iffin Bell); Silbeiman, supra note 5, at 1305.
 The Seventh Circuit recently summarized this argument while sanctioning a magis-
 trate-conducted jury trial:
 Article III commands that the judicial power of the United States be vested in
 article III courts. The reference procedur-e employed in this case did not con-
 stitute a divestiture of this power. Magistrates . . . are subject at all times to
 the direction, supervision, and control of the district courts. Thus, when a civil
 case properly within the jurisdiction of an article III court is tried before a
 magistrate pursuant to an order of reference by the district court, jurisdiction
 remains vested in the district court and is merely exercised through the medium
 of the magistrate.
 Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1979).
 188. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit qualified its broad language in Muhich, see note
 187 supra, by noting that de novo review ensured actual participation by an article III
 trial judge: "In this case, the district court retained its jurisdiction over the litigation by
 exercising its supervisory power in the form of de novo review, and by invoking its exclusive
 authority to order the entry of final judgment. The strictures of article III were therefore
 satisfied." 603 F.2d at 1251.
 189. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
 590 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:560
 Moreover, the internal delegation argument ignores the plain import
 of article III's language, which authorizes article III judges, and not their
 delegates, to exercise judicial power.'90 If article III could be construed
 to mean that jurisdiction need only be vested in the first instance in an article
 III court but could then be exercised by any assistant or adjunct body, the
 tenure and salary requirements would be a nullity. In this respect, the
 Supreme Court's reasoning in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok that participation on
 an article III court and exercise of article III decisionmaking powers by un-
 tenured judges would nullify the judgments of the article III courts should
 erase any doubt that all cases in article III courts must be decided by article
 III judges rather than by assistants or article I judges.'9'
 Thus, the internal delegation argument saves neither the bankruptcy
 court nor the magistrate system, because the range of their jurisdiction im-
 plicates article III policies. It is the scope of the jurisdiction exercised by
 an article I court, rather than qualifications on its powers'92 or placement
 as an adjunct to an article III court, that determines its constitutionality.
 Indeed, far from overcoming separation of powers problems, internal dele-
 gation of jurisdiction from an article III judge to an assistant violates a cen-
 tral precept of the separation of powers. The primary constitutional check
 on the judiciary is congressional control over federal court jurisdiction.
 Placing authority over the allocation of jurisdiction in judicial hands thus
 transgresses a basic functional division among the branches of govern-
 ment.'93 This constitutional defect is especially apparent in the Magistrate
 190. See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 57 (letter from Prof. Thomas Kratten-
 maker to Rep. Peter Rodino): "If the Constitution requires that a matter be heard by
 an Article III judge, I would simply assume that this means he, not his delegate, could
 hold jury trials or punish for contempt, or enter final judgments. Otherwise, such a
 constitutional rule would have no independent significance."
 191. Both the plurality and the dissent were in agreement on this point. 370 U.S.
 at 533 (plurality opinion); id. at 605 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Professor Silberman
 argues, however, that Glidden is not entirely apposite to the magistrate question, because
 that case entailed a delegation of power to an alternative tribunal. Silberman, supra
 note 5, at 1305. But Glidden involved judges from an alternative tribunal participating
 in decisions of article III courts. Thus, the precise issue presented in Glidden iS raised
 when magistrates exercise judicial power as part of an article III court. See Article III
 and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1035.
 192. See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 49 (letter from Prof. Herbert Wechsler
 to Rep. Peter Rodino). Similarly, the article I structure cannot be validated simply
 because Congress did not grant the court power to punish certain types of criminal con-
 tempt or to enjoin another court's proceedings. Although these limits do eliminate
 serious separation of powers and federalism problems that would be raised if an article
 I court, which is technically within the legislative branch, could enjoin proceedings in
 federal or state courts or punish for criminal contempt, the bankruptcy court still retains
 other judicial powers that implicate article III policies. It can enforce its judgments
 independently of any other court, it can issue writs of execution, it can conduct jury
 trials, and it can resolve constitutional and state law claims. Finally, it is the nature
 of a court's jurisdiction, more than the full range of its power, that determines whether
 it need be an article III court. Cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552-61, 572-79
 (1962) (irrelevant to article III status that powers and jurisdiction of Court of Claims
 and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are somewhat limited).
 193. See Article III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1038-39 & nn.80-82 (internal
 jurisdictional delegation presents even more serious constitutional difficulties than jurisdic-
 tional transfer from article III to article I courts).
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 Act, which has no specific guidelines for delegating jurisdiction to magis-
 trates.
 The internal delegation scheme also threatens the second aspect of
 judicial independence protected by article III's provisions. As noted
 previously, the tenure and salary guarantees operate to protect judges from
 coercion or discipline by their colleagues.'94 Under the Bankruptcy Reform
 Act, however, bankruptcy judges are susceptible to control by other federal
 judges because they are adjuncts to the district courts, their judgments may
 in some instances be appealed to district judges, and they are subject to the
 disciplinary review of the circuit judicial council.'95 The Magistrate Act also
 poses a risk that judges may exercise subtle influence over magistrates' de-
 cisions by vesting authority in district judges to appoint magistrates, to
 choose cases for reference, and to discipline and remove magistrates for
 misconduct. A magistrate may be wary of rendering a ground-breaking or
 unpopular decision if he knows the consequences may be future references
 in only the most mundane or onerous cases, a curtailment of authority, or
 failure to be reappointed. Any scheme relying on internal collegial control
 of decisionmakers vested with judicial power may eventually undermine the
 integrity of the judicial process.'96
 B. Appellate Review
 Advocates of the magistrate and bankruptcy systems have also argued
 that delegation of initial decisionmaking power presents no article III diffi-
 culties because appellate review is available in an article III court.19T Sup-
 port for this argument is allegedly found in the constitutional scheme,'98
 which actually assures only that an appellate-level article III tribunal will
 be available to any given litigant, because Congress is not required to estab-
 lish any inferior federal courts.'99 This reasoning begs the question, how-
 194. See notes 165-68 and accompanying text supra.
 195. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
 196. See Kaufman, supra note 59, at 710-14. Widespread reference to magistrates
 may also impair the integrity of the judicial process in additional ways. If particular
 categories of cases are routinely handled by magistrates, development and exploration in
 those legal areas may become stultified, because magistrate opinions are currently un-
 published, and they lack the precedential weight of district court decisions. See Article
 III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1053. In addition, public respect for the judiciary
 as a highly qualified, impartial defender of the Constitution and laws may be undermined
 by a perception that judges and lower-status magistrates are fungible. See id. at 1057.
 197. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1364, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 11 (1978); Silberman,
 supra note 5, at 1316-17.
 198. Those who contend that article III is satisfied by provision for appellate review
 also rely on Crowell v. Benson, reading that case as laying down the principle that no
 conclusion of fact or law ever need be determined in the first instance by an article III
 court. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 5, at 1316. As discussed previously, however,
 Crowell is a much narrower decision, resting on a recognition of the distinction between
 administrative factfinding adjudication and the full range of judicial functions. See notes
 136-38 and accompanying text supra.
 199. For example, Professor Silberman argues that "[tlo the extent that article III
 does impose certain requirements on the judicial process, it would seem to be satisfied
 by appellate, not initial, determination by such constitutional tribunals. Indeed, the ori-
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 ever, because the policies and provisions of article III do not become
 controlling until Congress has created an inferior federal tribunal. More-
 over, the appellate review argument implies that the tenure and salary pro-
 visions need apply only to appellate judges, a suggestion totally unwarranted
 by the language of article III, which encompasses any federal court estab-
 lished by Congress.200 In addition, because the threats to the separation of
 powers and judicial integrity envisioned by the Framers of article III flow
 largely from control of judges' subsistence and tenure, rather than from di-
 rect manipulation of the law, appellate review is an inadequate corrective. It
 reaches only errors of law, not the subtler corruptions, and, because only
 a certain proportion of cases actually go to trial, and even fewer are ap-
 pealed, the limited corrective available at the appellate level will not affect
 the bulk of litigation.
 Finally, the appellate review argument is without precedential founda-
 tion, and appears to be refuted by Glidden Co. v. Zdanok. In indicating that
 an article I judge's participation in a trial in an article III court would render
 the judgment void, the Supreme Court took no solace in the fact that ap-
 pellate review in an article III tribunal was available.20'
 At this point, it is apparent that the article I bankruptcy court does
 not satisfy the article III policy test, and thus is unconstitutional. Rather
 than eliminating conflicts with article III policies, the internal delegation and
 appellate review provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act create additional
 constitutional problems. The validity of the Magistrate Act is not so easily
 resolved, however, because its requirement that litigants consent to a refer-
 ence arguably makes trial 'by magistrate constitutional.202
 C. Litigant Consent
 Relying on the venerable case of Kimberly v. Arms,203 courts have tradi-
 tionally validated consensual references investing masters or magistrates with
 broad authority. In that case the Supreme Court held that upon the con-
 sent of the parties a master could hear the matter and report findings of fact
 and law to the judge. The judge was to treat these findings as presumptively
 ginal constitutional scheme, absent any inferior federal judiciary, assured only appeal to
 an article III court." The virtually exclusive role once played by stiate courts in re-
 solving federal question cases also "suggest[s] that the initial disposition of judicial matters
 may be made by other than an article III tribunal when appeal to such a tribunal is
 available." Silberman, supra note 5, at 1316-17.
 200. See D. Currie, Federal Courts 120 (1968); Comm. Print No. 13, supra note 13,
 at 65 (letter from Prof. Sandalow to Rep. Rodino). See also note 1 and accompanying text
 supra.
 201. Indeed, if appellate review were sufficient to remedy constitutional problems in-
 herent in trial by a non-article-Ill officer, the Court could have resolved Glidden on the
 substantive merits, for its own imprimatur would then have eliminated the jurisdictional
 constitutional issue. Justice Harlan's conclusion that the article I/article III court issue
 could not be avoided, 370 U.S. at 534, is therefore instructive.
 202. Several commentators have concluded that consent is the constitutional cure-
 all. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 5, at 1350-54; Comment, An Adjudicative Role for
 Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 584 (1973).
 203. 129 U.S. 512 (1889). See also DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
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 correct unless clearly erroneous.204 In Kimberly v. Arms and subsequent
 cases that emphasize the importance of consent, however, ultimate adjudica-
 tory authority remained with the district judge.205 "Judicial power" was not
 vested in the article I officer. This fundamental distinction between past
 cases and the Magistrate Act is illustrated by circuit courts' refusals, on con-
 stitutional grounds, to entertain direct appeals from magistrate trials, even
 when the reference was consensual.206
 These difficulties may seem minimal if consensual reference is analo-
 gized to arbitration or other alternative methods of dispute settlement. Ac-
 cording to this analogy, because the parties may agree to submit their con-
 troversy to an arbitrator or an alternative tribunal, bypassing the article III
 judiciary altogether, they may also authorize a magistrate to resolve their
 case.207 There is a crucial constitutional distinction, however, between arbi-
 tration and trial by magistrate. When parties select an alternative to judicial
 resolution, such as arbitration, they choose not to invoke the "judicial power
 of the United States" described in article III.208 Although arbitration awards
 are traditionally final and binding, supposedly exempt from judicial scrutiny
 on the merits,209 arbitrators may not issue writs of execution or contempt
 citations, nor do they enjoy other attributes of judicial power. On the
 other hand, when parties consent to trial by magistrate, they do not select
 an alternative tribunal-their controversy remains within the province of the
 204. 129 U.S. at 524.
 Similarly, absence of consent has been deemed fatal to case-dispositive references. See
 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d
 348, 359-61 (7th Cir. 1972).
 205. Even under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review for masters' and magis-
 trates' findings, the court still retains broad powers. For example, if either party chal-
 lenges the officer's report, the judge may adopt, modify, or reject the findings in whole
 or in part, or may seek further evidence. See 28 U.S.C. ? 636(b) (1) (1976); Silberman,
 supra note 5, at 1330.
 206. See authorities cited in note 46 supra.
 207. See, e.g., DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 504-05
 (lst Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Comment, supra note 202, at 592-94.
 This argument stems from the Court's statement in Kimberly v. Arms that "[a]
 reference by consent of parties, of an entire case for the determination of all its issues,
 though not strictly a submission of the controversy to arbitration-a proceeding which
 is governed by special rules-is a submission of the controversy to a tribunal of the
 parties' own selection." 129 U.S. at 524.
 208. Parties commonly contract to submit disputes to arbitration, thereby agreeing
 not to seek judicial process. The binding effect of the arbitrators' award flows from the
 contractual agreement to abide by it, rather than from an exercise of judicial power.
 The Justice Department has been exploring proposals for compulsory arbitration of
 certain disputes filed in court. See Address of Att'y Gen. Benjamin R. Civiletti Before
 the W. Va. Bar Ass'n and the W. Va. Chamber of Commerce 6-7 (Aug. 31, 1979). If these
 forced arbitrations are accorded the binding preclusive effect traditionally surrounding labor
 arbitrations, with no guarantee of de novo judicial review or entry of final judgment by the
 court, the system may amount to a denial of judicial process in violation of due process.
 This is not to suggest, however, that once a dispute has come under judicial auspices it may
 never be resolved in an alternative forum. Parties may agree to dismiss the court proceedings,
 removing the dispute from the province of the judiciary, and then to refer the matter to
 arbitration. Absent removal from the courts, however, the concerns underlying article III
 remain implicated.
 209. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
 594 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:560
 courts.210 They have invoked judicial process, and the magistrate, as an
 officer of the court, enters a binding order in the name of the court. Thus,
 trial by magistrate implicates the judicial power of article III and its under-
 lying policies, whereas arbitration does not.
 The fundamental premise of the consent rationale is that the right to
 an article III judge is a due process right, inuring to the benefit of litigants,
 and waivable like any other due process right.21' For example, it has been
 argued that consensual magistrate jury trials are constitutionally proper be-
 cause, if parties may waive the right to trial by jury altogether, they may
 consent to a lesser form of jury trial.212 Even with consent, however, jury
 trials presided over by magistrates may still present due process problems.
 Under Justice Brandeis's formulation in Crowell v. Benson,218 the due pro-
 cess right to a jury trial in federal court is inextricably linked to a require-
 ment of article III judicial process.214 The seventh amendment has always
 been construed to contemplate jury trials supervised by article III judges.215
 The judge helps shape the outcome by instructing the jury on the law, mak-
 ing legal and evidentiary rulings, and weighing witness credibility. The
 judge also retains the power to direct a verdict or to set it aside. De novo
 review of the record by a district judge of a magistrate-conducted jury trial
 may not be sufficient to interject the judicial role that is constitutionally re-
 quired, because the evidentiary rulings and instructions that fundamentally
 shape the verdict will have been rendered by the magistrate.216 Thus, in
 210. Judge Swygert, dissenting in Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1253 (7th Cir.
 1979), notes that references to magistrates are readily distinguishable from alternative
 dispute resolution forums:
 It is important initially to recognize what this case is not. It is not a situation
 where private parties have agreed between themselves to submit their differences
 to a private dispute resolution process such as arbitration. Nor is it a case
 where a party seeks federal court enforcement of the outcome of a private
 dispute arbitration. It is not even a case where certain matters have been
 separated out of a federal court action for initial reference to a specialized
 factfinder . . . . Rather, this is a case where an officer other than a constitu,
 tional judge performed one of the most traditional of judicial functions, that
 of presiding over a trial (with a jury) on the merits, not in a private capacity
 or as part of an isolated segment of an action but fully under the aegis of the
 formal judicial power of the United States as defined in Article III of the Con-
 stitution.
 Some courts have not been so careful to discern these distinctions. See, e.g., DeCosta
 v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 50405 (lst Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Article III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1047 n.132 (dis-
 cussing DeCosta's error).
 211. See, e.g., DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (lst Cir.
 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Silberman, supra note 5, at 1350-54.
 212. See, e.g., Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689, 690 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1978).
 213. See note 170 and accompanying text supra.
 214. For this reason the expanded criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction in the Magi.-
 trate Act, see note 44 supra, appears to be unconstitutional.
 215. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899).
 216. Cf. Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974) (magistrate habeas hearings present
 risk of de facto magistrate adjudication, because these petitions turn largely on evaluations
 of credibility); United States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100
 S. Ct. 44 (1979) (No. 79-8) (in suppression hearing, where resolution depends on weighing
 credibility of witnesses giving conflicting versions of events, due process right to meaningful
 hearing before ultimate decisonmaker requires that article III judge, rather than magistrate,
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 light of the "inherently judicial" function of presiding over a jury trial, a
 litigant's right to waive a jury trial does not necessarily include a right to
 waive having the trial guided by an article III judge.217
 Even in nonjury trials, litigant consent to a reference may not eliminate
 all due process concerns. As district court dockets become increasingly
 clogged, refusal to consent to trial by magistrate may come to carry a price
 of excessive delay, increased cost, and judicial annoyance at being saddled
 with a case originally designated for reference. Faced with the realities of
 these systemic pressures, the wise or less than wealthy litigant may feel
 forced to "consent" to a reference.218 When this likelihood of forced con-
 sent is coupled with the previously noted danger of intrusion into a magis-
 trate's substantive decisions,219 it is apparent that the consensual reference
 procedure may not be a due process panacea after all.
 Assuming, however, that due process is fully satisfied-consent is freely
 and intelligently given and the magistrate is free of any inhibiting over-
 sight-the consensual feature of the Magistrate Act still is insufficient to
 cure article III difficulties. As noted previously, the requirements of article
 III are more than a matter of due process; they are a fundamental element
 of the structure and constitutional role of the judiciary.220 Thus, these re-
 quirements are "jurisdictional,"22' protecting judges, the public, and the
 constitutional framework as well as litigants, and therefore cannot be waived
 actually hear witnesses). See Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1255 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert,
 J., dissenting) (jury verdict shaped by rulings of presiding judicial officer; when magistrate
 conducts trial, "the situation is hardly conducive to" meaningful judicial review, which is
 "the saving feature in what appears . . . to be an abdication of the judicial function").
 217. The argument that the right to waive an article III judge and consent to refer-
 ence are indistinguishable fails to consider that when a litigant agrees to a magistrate-
 conducted jury trial, the right of waiver has not been exercised at all-the litigant is still
 receiving a jury.
 218. The consensual character of references may disappear as burgeoning caseloads
 make reference a routine procedure perceived by litigants as an acceptable norm rather
 than an unusual device reserved for exceptional circumstances. Article III and Magis-
 irates, supra note 5, at 1051 & n.152.
 219. See note 196 and accompanying text supra.
 220. See notes 153-75 and accompanying text supra.
 221. In distinguishing between constitutional provisions that only create rights in
 litigants and those that are "jurisdictional," the Supreme Court has said the test is
 whether the Framers intended the provision to be "an integral and inseparable part of
 the court." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297 (1930). In Patton, the Court
 applied this test to the constitutional right to a trial by jury and concluded that it was
 designed merely for the protection of defendants, and thus could be waived.
 In this context the term "jurisdictional" means more than "subject matter jurisdic-
 tion," which includes the matters courts may hear once they are established. The tenure
 and salary requirements, however, affect Congress's power to establish the courts in the
 first instance. Thus, they can be defined as "fundamental jurisdictional" requirements.
 Professor Silberman argues that because the tenure and salary requirements in ? 1
 are distinct from the subject-matter requirements in ? 2 of article III, they are not
 "jurisdictional," and thus magistrates may exercise article III judicial power when the
 parties consent. Silberman, supra note 5, at 1350. This argument does not, however,
 make the necessary distinction between the two types of "jurisdictional" requirements.
 It also suggests, unrealistically, that the court as an institution can be analytically dis-
 tinguished from the judges of which it is composed.
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 by parties.222 Litigants have no authority under the constitutional scheme
 to invest non-article-III officers with article III "judicial power."
 The requirement of litigant consent therefore does not cure the con-
 stitutional defects of the 1979 Magistrate Act. The conflicts with the prin-
 ciples of separation of powers, federalism, judicial independence, and due
 process inherent in a system of trial by magistrate can be avoided only if
 the ultimate authority to exercise judicial power remains with the article III
 district judge.223 Absent the protective device of de novo judicial review,
 the 1979 Magistrate Act cannot be reconciled with article III.
 CONCLUSION
 The doctrine of legislative courts has traditionally been limited to tri-
 bunals in geographic areas controlled by Congress and to courts whose
 jurisdiction extended only to matters of "public right" that were not "in-
 herently judicial." The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and 1979 Magis-
 trate Act go significantly beyond these limits, creating adjudicative systems
 that violate the policies of separation of powers, federalism, and judicial
 independence embodied in article III of the Constitution. Both Acts are
 thus unconstitutional, because Congress's power to establish article I courts
 is limited to situations that do not threaten article III values.
 Lucinda M. Finley
 222. There can be no better illustration of a constitutional provision that is an in-
 separable part of the court than article III, which seeks to maintain the integrity of the
 judicial role in the constitutional system. Consequently, just as two adverse parties from
 the same state cannot waive the diversity of citizenship requirement in seeking to estab-
 lish subject matter jurisdiction, litigants cannot waive the "fundamental jurisdictional" re-
 quirement of an article III court.
 223. For this authority to be meaningful, however, the district judge must do more
 than search for gross errors, as in appellate review. The trial-level role of the article
 III district courts must be preserved. This can be accomplished only if the article III
 judge independently weighs the evidence and the law, relying on the magistrate's report
 to focus the issues and guide the court, rather than dictating the ultimate outcome. See
 Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1978); Article III and Magis-
 trates, supra note 5, at 1043.
